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INTRODUCTION•

The subject of Collisions in United States Admiralty
Jurisdiction is a most important one in respect to Rll matters
of navigation.

Two ships collide.

One or both o' them is

injured or completely lost, the cargo is damaged, human life
is destroyed.

Has there beer. any negligence, who is to blame,

who may recover, what may be recovered and when may it be recovered,

are a few of the many questions that arise when a

case of' this kind is

brought into Court.

Fully half of the

Admiralty cases that come before the United States District
Courts arise out of Collisions.

This being the fact it is

important to know what tle law is upon the subject ard where
to find it.
However in spite of the importance of this subject, it
does not seem to ..
ave ever bee]1
writer.

If

noticed at all

in

separately treated by any text

any text book on Ad-mirality law,

it is given but little space in proportion to its

importance,

10.

and that space is largely :iven up to a statement of what the
rules of navigation are and a comparison of American nnd
English cases.

For the past thirty years even that degree of

attention does not seem to have been given.
changes have been mLade i

During that tim.e

the rules of navigation,

the statutes

of limited liability have been oroadened and further construction of the rules pertaining to navigation been rendered, tius
changing in me ny respects the law as then existing.

This being

the fact in order to discover what thIe law of Collisions is,
aside from such indirect light as other branches of Admiralty
law mnny afford, it is

necessary to go to the statutes and

adjudicated cases.
It ray be asked, "Though this is so, of what value is
such a knowledge of the Admiralty law of Collisions-- whee
gained?"

To the Admiralty lawyer it is of course, a necessary

knowledge in order trint he may proceed with a case at all
intelligently.

To those who do not follow Admiralty as a

specialty, it must be admitted it is of comparatively little
importance.

But suppose such a case does co-me to one not an

Admiralty lawyer, which frequently happens, and he has no

1j.

general knowledge of the differeht applic3tion of ColMnon Law
principles, of the construction of the technical rules laid
down for the guidaice of ships at sea,priority
many other questions that corvonly arise in

of liens,and the

a case of Collision.

He must either decline the case, or run the risk of al, ost
certain defeat because of his ignorance.

He may from a lack

of knowledge as to the different effect of contributory negligence bring his suit in

the state court and because of such

negligence lose everything, when by going into the United
States District Courts, at least half could have been saved
for his client.
So because of the importnnce of the subject as has been
stated and the necessity of going to the original sources for
informntior,
is

th-is subject of Collisiors has been chosen.

the purpose of the thesis to show what the law is

as applied

to collisions in United States Admiralty Jurisdiction.
so,

Statutes that seem to demand no explmation,

It

In doing

as those stat-

ing what are proper lights, signals etc., will only be refercou to and their force sr'o

effect indicated.

1-)

JURISDICTION OF THE ADMIRALTY COURTS.

At the outset of' this discussion,

it

is

necessary to know

in what waters and in respect to what vessels a question in
collisions may arise and come under the Jurisdiction of the
United States courts.

The constitution simply says that the

"Judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases
of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction,"

leaving the extent of

that jurisdiction to be decided.
As to Territory.
The jurisdiction as it exists to-day is territorially as
follows;

The High Seas,

other inland waters.

harbors,

rivers,

the Great Lakes and

The High Seas are usually defined as all

tide wpters below low water mark.

But from this broad defini-

tJon are usually excepted coast waters nnd harbors and rivers
affected by the tide.

Otherwise, every ocean port in

the United

States as well as such tide rivers as the Connecticut, the
Hudson,

and the Mississippi would be included for a great por-

tion of their length.

From the harbors,

rivers and other in-

land waters must be excepted all waters not forming a part of
a continuous waterway from one state to another state or

13.

nation.

Waters thus completely within the state an-d forming

no part of ar.

interstate or international water-way are under

State authority arid exemrt from Adrirmlt

Jurisdiction.

Any of

the small navigable lakes wholly within a state and forming
no part of such a water-way, would be examples of such exemption.
Adfhiralty Jurisdiction may be gained however, by connecting
such waters by a carnl so as to allow vessels to pass out on a
continuous water-way to another state.

Of this artificial

mode of gaining Admiralty JurisdictionCayuga Lake is a good
example.

Canals r:ust be included as inland waters and under

Admiralty Jurisdiction.

The Ohio River and the Chicago Canal

are examples of connecting waters both natural and artificial.
The conflict over the United States'

autnority

beinrg extended to the Great Lakes in questions of Admiralty
was long and bittercases.

It was finally decided in two collision

The first, "The Propeller Genessee Chief"

12 How.

44-3. wici was strengthened a-d furthered by "The Eagle" 8 Wall
15.
As to Vessels.
Admiralty Jurisdiction extends "to all vessels".
what constitutes a vessel there are many decisions.

As to
The fact

that the craft in

question is

not proelle3 by onrs,

steam or

sails, or is wholly engaged about harbors and docks and moved
about by tii-s, does not prevent its being looked upon as a
vessel.

Examples of what has been allowed ac a vesiel are the

following:
ruddCer,(b)

A steam

dredge (a)

A barge without sails or

A floating bath house,(c)

Sail-boats and

boats are also recognized by the rules of Congress.
floating hotel,(d)

row-

But a

and a ship not sufficiently conpletu

control its own movements, (e)

have been

to

denied the right

to come within adriralty co'izance.

In brief the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
over collisions extends to all cases orlsir

on the High Seas,

coast-waters, navigable ,,arbors, rivers, canals and other inland waters forming a part of a navigrable water-wvay extending
(a).

The Starbuck,

(b).

Desbrow, v.Walsh Eros.36 F.

(c).

Public Bath, No.l3,

(d).

The Steamboat Hendrick, 3 Benn. 417.

(e ).

Steamboat Vermont,

61 F.

Tep. 502.
Rep.

607.

11 F. Rep. 69?.

6 DenT. , 115.

15.

beyond the limits of a-single State,
to all craft that
vessels.

and the Great Lakesand

Ahe courtii will dignify with the name of

This authority extends by right only to cuses

a-n American vessel is

one of the parties,

where

but the jurisdiction

of Admiralty Courts !,1qy be extended to cases of collisions
arising betw een foreign vessels,
a hearing before them.

when such

vessels request

The exercise of this jurisdiction is

a matter of discretion with the court, but there should appear
special grounds for refusing it, w'en asked.

It

is

a matter of

courtesy to the ship asking such jurisdiction and to the
nations which they represent.
by the law of their domicile.

Such vessels will be bound only

WHAT CONSTITUTES A COLLISION.

A collision occurs "whenever two vessels coI

nii contart."

Thus any touching of one vessel by another technically constitutes a collision.

Such a meeting of vessels may occur

under three general conditions.
First: Both may be underway
Second:

Neither ship may be underway,but bot. riding at anchor-

Third: One slhip may be underway and the other riding at anchor.
An example of tle first would be,two vessels persuing
courses that cross and at such point of crossing the collision
occurs.
The second is

illustrated by two vessels riding at anchor,

but one or both so negligently secured as to allow them to be
thrown against each other by the action of wind and water.
The third case occurs when a snip in an attempt to pass
into its slip runs into another vessel riding near at anchor.
In whatever way the collision may occur it

is

within the prov-

ince of the Admiralty Jurisdiction to find out the party or
parties at fault and decide the case accordingly.

NEGLIGENCE.

A collision having occured it
f'irst,

is

neces;sary to dis;cover

whether there has been any negligence causing it,

second,

of wh.at thIe negligligence consists, and third, who the negligent
party or parties are, in order tlhat liability may be fixed for
the damages sustained.

On examination of a case,

found that one of' three conditions exist.

It

it

may be

may be found,

First, that no one was negligent:
Second, that only one or part of the parties were negligent:
Third, that both or all the parties were neligent.
Whether the parties are two or more is not important so
far as the principles of law applied are concerned, so for
most purposes but two will be considered.
These three cases will be taken up in their order, but
first it is necessary to consider whiat

-enerally speaking

amounts to negligence in a case of collision.
Defi ned.
Negligence in collision cases has been variously defined
but the definitins on the whole amount to this; tnat,

18.

"Negligence is

a failure to exercise

and courage of a competent seaman."

the ordinary skill,

care

Formerly, there seems to

have been a tendency to require a very high degree of care
when in

a trying position.

quirement at i resent
be sufficient

.

Put such certainly is

Ordinary

care and skiil

to demand of a seaman in

the difficulty of the c ituation is

not the re-

is

deemed to

an emergency,

because

such as to render even that

hard to exercise.
Ordinary care and skill must be looked upon as a comparative term.

To determine wheter

such care and skill

has been

used the circumstances under whicn the same were employed must
be taken into considerati r.
care and diligence
in

a crowded harbor,

perfect

What might constitute ordinary

on the open sea, might be c::treme negligence
or again a steam-sihip might proceed with

bacty over a course which a sailing vessel could not

follow without great risk of collision.

Or,a strong vessel of

any kind might safely go without negligence where an old and
weak ship could rot proceed except with great danger.
might be multiplied,

but it

"ordinary care and skill"

is
is

Examples

enough to sKiow thnt tle term of

comparative with the circumstances

under wi.ich the case arises and that the seaman must be one
competent to act under the conditions.
Inevitable Accident.
Act of God.
When a collision takes place without fault of either ship
its cause is termed "Inevitable Accident".

An Inevitable Acci-

dent occurs when the accident could not have been avoided by
any care or skill.

But in collisions, the term is applied

where the use of ordinary care and skill
the accident.

would not have avoided

This broader use of the term in Collisions

admits many cases that would otherwise be excluded.

An act of

God, however, would come within the more narrow definition.
A hurricane driving two ves.els together with a force beyond
their power to resist would be an example of such an act.
Vessels so colliding could in no way be held in fault.

Another

example would be an unexpected calr:. following a strong breeze
or wind, or a sudden veering of the wind that could not have
been ai-ticipated.

Such a calm or veering must clearly have bee-n

beyond all reasonatle expectation.
variable wind was blowing,

So in a case where a light

which at timues woull suddeY-ly fail,

and a vessel while tacking was made to collide with another

20.

because of su:1
1 a fnilure of the wind,
of God could not be set up.

the defense of an act

The momentary calms. were riot

sufficiently unexpected to prevent a preparation against their
occurren'ie

Previous warning that the wind might fail at any

moment had been given by its reported f'ilure previously.

To

constitute an act of God, therefore, it must be such an act as
human foresight could not provide against either because of its
suddenness or

overroweriTi

force.

Strong currents caused by

the usual action of the tides, no matter hov, svift and powerful,
if known to exist can not be classed as such acts.

An act of

God being shown as the cause of a colli.ion all imputation of
negligence is at once removed.
From tne nature of the case.,practical!y the only acts of
God that can concern a collision are those in the nature of a
storm, higfi winds or unexpected failure of the wind.
sion might arise because or unknown curre-it2 or

A collie

a tidal wave,

but such cases are so improbable as to be of value only as
exaples.
Inevitable ActL.
Besides the cases where an act of' God iias occurred, there
are many others whicii are looked upon as inevitable accidents.

What such cases are will be best seey by examples.
Two ships are lying side by side,
the swell it
the
is

r.

creates,

another pasaes ,ind by

causes one ship to be thrown against

As betwecL the two ships thus at rest the accident

inevitable.

It

could not have been -rrcvented by any ordin-

ary care and skill.

Had the respondent vessel been run into

by another and in that way driven against the other ship, the
same defense would exist.
Examples are found, in the drawing of a spile to which the
ship was properly fastened and consequent damage ensuing;

(a)

extrTc darkness may prevent either vessel from seeing the
other until too late to avoid a collision,(b) a vesscl set
adrift by some vis major, as a mass of ice or drifting lUmber
A dense fog in which a ship is pro-

thrown against it. (c)

ceeding as slowly as posDible and runs foul of a ship at
anchor- (d)
Cushing,

(a)

The Mary L.

(b)

The Morning Light,

(c)

The Transfer,

(d)

Bridgeport,

2 Wall.

56 F.

35 F.

60 F.

Rep.

Rep.

Rep.1l0.
550.

513.
159.

22.

Also when an intervening object shuts out of view another
vessel,

which,

because of that flct,

prevent a coilsiion.
steamer or a hulk is

is

discovered too late to

This would be the case woen an advancing
in the way.

Neither vessel ca.

see the

other and eaci; supposes it

Las only the steamer and other visi-

ble objects to deal with.

Both having exercised duie

able care,

-. d reason-

the accident must be looked ui-on as inevitable.(a)

Had th.e inlt(evXing object been a projecting headlanid such as

to shut out a part of the path of navigation,
ships were liable to appear,

and around which

the excuse of an inevitable acci-

dent because of an intervening object could not be employed.
The vessel colliding must be held negligent for not looking out
for just such ships as might come out from behind the headland.
The difference in these cases seems to be largely, if not entirely, one of probability.

That one vessel in rotion should

remain hidden behind another, whether in motion or at rest,
sufficiently long to endanger collision is

much more probable

than when a headland intervenes which may easily conceal an oncoming ship for a considerable distance.
(a)

The Java,

14 Wall.

189.

There is

dicta to

23.

the effect that when such a collision occurred in waters unfrequented by vessels, being removed from the usual course of
s2.ips,

that it

ray be regarded as inevitable accident.

probability of a collision under the circumstances is

The
here

again brought into consideration.
A disabled vessel may be one of the parties to a collision.
If the vessel with which it collides does not know of its disabled condition ,rd is otherwise navigating in a proper manner,
no fault c n be attributed to it.

The weak vessel in order

to free itself from fault must at least have endeavored to
give proper warning of its injured condition.
deavored to fulfill

its

Having so en-

duty proriptly and feiled because of

its weakness the collision which ensues may be looked upon as
inevitable.

The vessel's weak condition at sea will always

act as an excuse for fault attributable to its condition, if
not due to its own wrong doing.

But when a vessel deliber.tely

puts to sea in an unseaworthy condition, there is no doubt that
her feeble state is no defense, but rather evidence condemning
her-

Whether such a defense may be set up, and inevitable

accident

claimedwhen

the injury disabling a vessel has been

24.

caused by another collision, for which she was more or less to
blame has been questioned.

But to so hold when a vessel is

acting properly In the second collision would it is considered
be too severe, and inevitable accident may be pleaded as when
not in

fault for the prior

accident.

The James

.30

Fe...

Rpt.2WO., is an example of the necessity of a weak or injured
vessel giving wu-lir.g of its

condition.

The use of proper

care by both vessels must have been exercised as above indicated,
or a case of inevitable accident will not be adjudged to have
occured.
When a collision occurs by the snapping of a chain or the
parting of a tiwler rope or the binding of the steering gear,
or any other similar accident,not the fault of those superintending that wieic

fails to act, a case of inevitable accident will

be allowed. A latent defect is usually a good defaiCco,if proved.
But if

in

any way due to the carelessnes of those w-.o should

attend to the tiing broven as where a wire rope was used witn
one or two broken strandsia)

or a chain with badly worn links,

no such plea can be sustained, but instead a clear case of
(a)

The Olympia 61 F. Rept. 120.
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negligence exists

.

Where a nut-was siown to have benr. allowed

to work off, the defence cannot be sustained.(b)

These were

things under the direct supervision of the ship master and crew
and by ordinary care would have been seer to and kept in a safe
and fit

condition for the purpose for which they were irtended.

In these cases considered, an act of God is the only instance where the accident is in the nature of things strictly
inevitable

.

In the other cases an extremely high degree of

care would as a rule have avoided the collision.

The reasons

for looking upon an act of God as excusing are plain.

Such

an act cannot be guarded against by man's care and forethought.
It

may occur when he is using tihe highest degree of skill and

care and force one ship against another. No blame can attach.
In the other cases where an Act of God is not present. It is
simply a question of whether or not the court will look upon
the care and skill used by the respondent as equal to the ordinary care and skill of an ordinary competent seamrn in a like
position.

To require a higher test would tend to make collis-

ions rever excusable and apply a harsh rule upon all those who
(O)

The Altenower E'C F. Rep.

118.
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conduct navigation.
It

must not be understood that the mere fact that at the

time ordinary care and skill could not prevent the collision
will make the case one of inevitable accident.

If it is due

to the negligence of either party that such conditions ilave
ariser,

it

i;

riot sufficient to show that as soon as the danger

was perceived it

could not be avoided,

though everything was

done that could be done under the then existing circumstances.
The ordinary care and skill must have been exercised not only
at such time when the danger was perceived,

but also for such

a time previous as would have been required to prevent a coming
into the position where such efforts would not be effectual.
A vessel proceeding
crowded iA.itl

at too high a rate of speed in a place

Kiys, u .til

too late to avoid the accident or

without a lookout,

will be regarded as having no claim to the

plea of inevitable

ccident however well they may have behaved

in

the presence of irmmecdiate colli-Sion,

(a)

A violation of the

rules of navigation of which tL.e above would be an exo.wprle,
wil1_ prevent
(a)

the successful use of' such a plea,

The Twenty-one Friends 33 F.

Rpt.

190.

if

in

any way
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such non- compliqnce contributed to the accident.
will be presumed in

in such a case.
violation,

If

favor of the coli-sion bein

Nothing
without fault

the accident was inevitable apart from the

the respordent may show it.

him however, to do so.

It

rests entirely upon

This question of burden of proof will

be separately considered.
In brief,inevitable accident may be shown when the care,
courage and swill of an ordinarily competent seaman under the
circumstances would not have averted the collision.

And such

an accident being shown, no negligence is deemed to h1ave existed.
It is next necessary to consider the cases wrere negligence
was present causing the collision.

The ways in which a vessel

may be negligent are almost as varied as her motionls and the
conditions under which she may be placed.

It is possible there-

fore, only to indicate generally the various kinds of negli.Tence,
Negligence may be roughiy classified first, as negligence consisting of a direct violatinbg of the rules of Navigation or
failure to follow a well regulated custom, and second, when tue
rules of naviCation arid customs have been practically followed,
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but there has been carelesEInes,

whi-le following them.

Under

these two heads all kinds of negligence may be brought.

The

main point of value in this distinction is in respect to questions of burden of proof.

A violation of the rules being shown,

the burden is upon the party so violating.

In case of a collI--

ion also it has been previously pointed out that one or both
of the vessels may be in

fault,

and yet remain

in

court.

The mere fact of a collision dces not of itself raise any
presumption of negligence on the part of either ship.
ships have collided.

Two

Both are to be deemed free from fault un-

til something is shown denying such an assuimption.

Such an

assumption may be denied by showing a violation of rules and
customs , also by the circumstances under which time collision
occured, or by some clearly negligent act on the part of one
or both vessels, aside from such rules and circumstances.
Violation of Pules.
The rules are violated most frequently in cases of too
high a rate of speed,and in

the use of lights and other signals,

It is the law of the sea as of the road "to turn to the right",
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and a needless failure to so do must be looked upon -,2 negligence.

So in all cases a violation of the !aw of' navigation or

a failure to follow n well recognized custom will always be
looked upon as negligence until evidenc e is

brought to show

that such violation of the law or failure to follow a well established custor,

did not contribute to the collision.

The

laws are given as defining the scope in

which a vessel may act

in entire safety from any legal blame.

Having disregarded

these commands shaped in

the form of rules,

an imputation of

negligence must follow when a collision has thus occurred or
the rules would lose their force.

A well regulated custom has

practicAlly the force of law, in fact amounts to an unwritten
law.

That such customs are to bcobscrvedis clearly stated in

the rules relating to navigation, (a)

This general statement

concerning a violation of the sailing rules is supported by
all

the cases.

To consider them all selarately would only

result in deducing the general rule stated of such violation
being prima facie evidence of negligence.
(a)

26 Statut at Large P. 320.
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(Better Methods) no Excuse for Violating the Rules.
The question naturally ariseswould it be considered negllgerce in a vessel, if it pursued a course contrary to the
rules laid down by Congress, but looked upon by the best seamen as a much safer mode of navigation than that prescribed by
law.

By many attorneys appearing for a desperate respondent,

such a course has been stoutly argued as the only proper one
to pursue.

At first thougit, it might seem that such care

h,.ving been used, all imputation of negligence ought to be removed.

The best of seamen are the ones who should best know

what constitutes the safest mode of navigation.
of the laws is

to make navigation safe and if

The purpose

the acts of the re

respondent are such as tend more surely to further that end,
cording to the opinion of those most competent to judge,

ac-

what

reason can there be for holding the vessel so actingre guilty
of negligence?
to notice it.

As this argument is frequently used it is

well

The trouble with allowing such a contention any

weight, rests in the fact thathowever true the opinion of
expert seamen may be as to the propriety of allowing such a

method of navigation, it is not a general rule.

The next com-

pany of experts th-at co:--e together might well have an entirely
different opinion of what was best and so lead to hopless confusion.

The rules of navigation as given would be of no effect,

and each case would have to be tried out in court to decide
whose system of navigation was best.

For safety there must be a

given set of rules to be disregarded only at the peril of thiose
so violating.

It i s plain that without suchi

would not know what to expect of n.other-

a system one ship

One who takes a

course forbidden by law does so at his peril and the ex.uso that
the unlawful way is the best, will not save him, and in a case
of collision in Admiralty there is no good reason why the rule
should be varied.

If the master of a ship prefers to run such a

risk, re may, but he and his ship will be held to blame for any
collision occuring thereby.
A good example of cases involving this theory is seen wnere
greater speed has bee',- r]intained than was allowed by law.

In

fact, it is in connection with the questior of speed tnat this
argument usualjy has been presented.

Section 423

of the
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Revised Statutes reads, "Every steam vessel when approaching
another vessel so a6 to involve risk of collision shall slacken
her speed or if necessary stop and reverse and every steam
vessel shall when in a fog go at a moderate speed."
This section came up for interpretation in the City of
New York 15 F.

Ref.

62= and again in the Clare, admr..vProvidence.

S.S.Co.20F. Rep. 535.

In the later case, the steam vessel in

fault was steering from one light of a narrow channel across
to another at full speed in a heqvy fog.

Experienced seamen

agreed in saying that this was safer than going at the moderate
speed required by law, so long as that speed meant less than
full speed.

It was said that by going at a slower rate, col-

lision would be more apt to occur as the ship more eaisily

lot

her way not being able to tell so accurately how long it would
take at the reduced speed to come in sight of the opposite
light as it was possible to do when going at the usual rate.
The judge, however, looked upon the law as of first consideration,
and importance. Whatever the section right mean by 'moderate
speed' it was clear it meant less than the usual rate.

The

laws of navigation demanded that a certain mode of navimtion
be followed.

If

the laws were unwise, it

was the province of

Congress to enact now ones not that of the courts or expert seamen.

Any other decision on this question would of recossity

nullify the law.
Circunstances Raising Presumption of Negligence.
The circumstances under which a collLsior

occurs may be

such as to impute negligence to a vessel when shown, though
the bare fact of n collision does not.

The relation of the two

vessels may be such as to leave no rea -crable ground for any
other conclusion.

In The Bridgeport 7 Blachford 361, a steam-

boat ran into a vessel

lying moored to a wtarf,

nearly head on about amid-ships.
vailed hiding the ship and wharf.

striking her

At the time v heavy fog preThe lights above the wf.arf,

however, were visible arid the locality was known by the person
steering the vessel.

The court held thnt under such circum-

stances a presumption of negligence was raised, by the fact of
a collision against the vessel in motion.

No vessel could be

seen, but it waz known that the locality was one where vessels
were very likely to be.

This was shown by the lights v; sible
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above the wharf.

This decision has since been sustained, and

is still indicative of the rule that negligence may be presumed
when a collision occurs because of the surrounding circumstnnces.

Wher the collision takes place and one ship is out of her

course, the presium.ption of contributory negligence arises from
the fact that a rule of navigation has beer. violated, rather
than from the circumstances aside from any violation.

A ship

in motion colliding with a ship at anchor always tends to raise
a presumption against the moving ship.

The presumption thus

raised as in the violation of' the rules of navigation may be
overcome.
Where no Presumption Arises.
The cases where a presumption of neligence arises have
been considered.

As to what constitutes negligence aside from

these special cases, there is no marked difference, between
Admiralty and Coarmon law.

The acts complained of must be

shown to have constituted negligence which aided in bringing
about the collision.

In

every such case,

where there is

no

presumption, the entire question of negligence is one of unaided f)ct.

in a search for negligent acts, the court will not

always be satisfied by finding fault in one or even in bothl
vessels but,

if the neg*ligenec is very slight on one side and

very great on the other, it

may endeavor to discover wheth.er

the negligence contributing to the disaster was suffficient
under thae circumstances to hold t-ie party responsible at all.

In such cases, where the negligence is very slight, if any,
the court may disregard it as not being of sufficient importance
and certainty to be given any insight.

This would apply only

to cases where the neglect complained of relative to thie consequences to be suffered if" held to create a liability would
be entirely disproportionate.

In such instances the neglect

on the part of the other vessel is considered as being sufficient to have caused the damage.
Proximate Cause.
In both law and admiralty it
is

is sought to discover what

the proximate cause of an injury suffered and the negligen-

ce of a party is

judged accordingly.

certain ft rts being shown,

In

tile previous cases,

they were at once connected as the

proximate cause of a collision by menrs of a rebutable presu-np-

tion.

In cases where no such presumption arises not only must
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a negligent act be shown, but also some evidence that such an
act contributed to the collision.

So in a given case though

negligence might be proved on the part of either libellant or
respondent, if such negligence is not in some way connected
with the disaster either by presumiiption or direct evidence as
the proximate cause of the injury in whole or in part,
not be considered.

it

will

When a presumption has been raised it

must

be removed by snowing thvit the negligence in no way contributed
to the disaster.
It

may be that both vessels were in fault, but one vessel

had every chance to have avoided the collision.
if

one vessel is

In

such a case,

to be looked upon as alone to blame, it will

be that one which had the last clear chlance to avoid danger.
Though the injured ship was guilty of some negligence, that
negligence will not count against it,

if the other vessel had

ample opportunity to see the position of the vessel injured
and did nothing to avoid a collision, but instead was itself
,iilty of neglect, contributing directly to the disaster.
MylcCalden,

v.

The Edgew,-ter,

65,

tration of whiat is here ieant.

F. Rep.

527,

is

The

a good illus-

Two tows were -,as3lng, one up
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tne other down the river.

Just beyond one of tihom the vessel

of the libellant was proceeding at a high rate of speed,
its

masts extending fifty

or sixty feet above th,.e tow,

with

though

thus in nearly full view, the respondent, after waiting for
the tows to 1'ass,

started alhead at full

with the libeliant.

The negligence of the respondent was held

to be the proximate cause,
bear the loss.

speed and collided

and that,

that vessel alone must

The libellants negligence consisted in not com-

plying with the Starboard rule.

But the fact ti-at it

so comply had no effect on the result,

did not

as the respondent

could

easily have se-n and avoided the danger, had it been tending
to its duty.

It was a vessel at rest, about to start in motion

at full speed, before doing so it had the last clear opportunltr to have avoided any possibility of a collision.

Having

entirely disregarded this opportunityit must suffe-f the consequences of being held alone in
of the collision.
of the tows,

it

any different.
her,

fault for the proximate cause

Had the libellant been on the proper side

was not thought th it
In

th e result would have been

either case the respondernt should j-ave seen

and had the last clear chance of avoiding collision by

so doing.
The Portia, G4 F. Rep. 811, is a case involving this same
question of proximate cause.

A line of tu ts wals cra.ing up a

river and a steam-boat was going down.
violatiL7 the rules of navigation,
full

view and plenty of room in

The line of tugs war

but the steam-boat had a

which to avoid them.

In try-

ing to do so,the steam-boat herself violated the rules and
thereby caused a collision which would not have occurred but
for such a violation.

The act of the steam-boat was looked

upon as the proximate cause.
the tow,

She had every opportunity to avoid

and being handled with greater ease, was possessed of

the last clear chance to do so.
Negligence may consist in
ships putting to sea in
meeting a sciooner,

(a)
a defective equipment, or in

an unseaworthy

condition.

a

A steamer on

puts her Lelm over to avoid t:nat vessel and

the rudder ch-iin snaps, causing a collision; If in such a case
the chain wais badly worn,

and trough open to ready inspection,

had not been attended to,

the fact will be looked upon by the

court as constituting negligence on the part of the owners.
(a)

The Clara,

55 F.

Rep.

1021.
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A defective engine on a steam-boat, failure to employ a tug
when rocliired;

an insufficient or unskillful crew,

ing vessol not in
ligneces

good trim,

and a sail-

are furt.er instances of such neg-

on the part of the ships owner.

in all sucl-: cases

the ovmrers. are perrnitted to show that they properly equipped
the vessel and carefully looked to its being in rood condition
and properly manned at the time it started out.

They would

also show that they took care to keep the same in needed repair.

Such evidence if sustained, would constitute a good

defense.
As has been said,

a loss may arise where the party in

fault does not cone into actual contact with the ship injured.
A good example of such a collision
The James Gray,

v.

The John Frazier,

Gray was lyin; by in
out any light,
wise at fault.
of a tug.

the channel in

is

found in

21 How.

the case of
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The James

Charleston harbor, but with-

contrary to the harbor regulations and otherThe John Frazier came into the chiannel in

tow

There was plenty of room to pass and the James Gray

was clearly visible.

Mihen about four hundred feet distant,

the tug carelessly cast off without giving tiie John Fra2er any

warning.

The impetus of the vessel, in

spite of all

that could

be done to Yrevenrt a collision, carried it against the James
Gray,

doing a considerable

damage.

The court held ti:at the

tug must be looked upon as the boat whose negligence caused the
collision and not the John Frazier,

which actually collided.

The James Gray was also looked upon as in fault for its violation of the harbor rules.

The only ground upon which the John

Frazier could have been held negligent,
agency.

would have been that of"

But that too, ought to fail for the reason that no

such act as that of hurling the vessel free in the channel
could in any way be looked upon as authorized by the principle
in

employing txhe agent.
Whether two vessels or one are in

questions arise in
negligence in

respect to negligence.

no different

Wat constitutes

one ship will constitute negligence in

as a general rule.

compelled to hold its

other to keep out of the way,

as is

with sailing vessels and those propelled by steam.
vessels are in

another

Exceptions to this statement may occur-

An example would be when one vessel is
course and t.e

fault,

a'n equal position,

the case
But if

the

the general statement applies.
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Acts in Extremis.
In considering what constitutes negligence, it must not
be understood tlhat an act committed,

or an omission to act,

the extremity of the moment of collision, will
negligence,

when the difficult

of thc ship so acting.
helm to post,

when it

position is

in

be re-arded as

not due to the fault

An exa!iple would be the putting of the
should have been put

to starboard,

the

circumstances being such as to confuse a seaman of ordinary
nerve

and experience.

this holding.

An arbitrary admiralty rule might vary

The Galileo, 28 F. Rep. 469, was a case where

in the presence of inevitable collision the engines were reversed,

but an anchor was not dropped which might have averted

the collision.

Such ani omission in the extremity of the moment

was looked upon as excusable.

In anothier case,(a)

a steam-

boat allowed a sailing vessel to get too near and then in the
extremity of danger, committed an error.

This was hold inexcus-

able as the s±ip so doing was not free from blame before the
error was comiitted.(b)

So in order to have an act or its

(a)

The Carroll, 8 Wall. 302.

(b)

The Elizabet2 Jones,

112 U.S.

514.

omission excused,

when done in

before the collision,

the s.-Ap so acting must be otheo'wise fvou,

That such ricts in

from blame.

the excitment of ti-e -.-ioment

extrorils should be excused,

sustained by the equitable side of the court's powers.
both vessels are so acting or fail
free from fult,

to act,

in

is

1,V, ere

a case otherwise

the case becomes one of inevitable accident

which has been previously considered.
Pilot's
If

Negzligence.

a pilot is

llsion occurs,

directing the course of a ship when a col-

the question naturally arises,

gence of the pilot be attrbted
When the pilot
but th!at it

1-as

will the negli-

to the ship under his care?

be*n taken volentariiy,there

should and would,

is

no doubt

he being the ship's volentary

agent for the purpose of navigation.

The contention arises

when a vessel is compelled to take a licensed pilot by force
of law.

It is said tlt such a pilot cannot 'be looked upon

as an agent of the vessel, but ratler as an agent of the law,
so that the ship ought not to be liable for a collision caused
alone by his negligence.

In

the Ciina,

7 Wall.

53,

the question

arose squarely in a case of negligence on the part of the pilot

Lj3.D

which caused a collision.

It

was held t iat tio ne-ligece

the pilot must be looked upon as the ship' s negligence.
discussion has been cited with force in

of

This

later cases. (a).(b).

Siderainda v. Mapes, 3 F. Rep. 873, is cited as supporting a
contrary doctrine,
in

that case is

but it

is

not at all

in

point.

The pilot

being sued by the owner of' the vessel

he was

piloting and no question of injury to a third vessel arises.
Tii following thle principle laid down in
rule has ben

The China,

the English

refused as not tending to the best public good.

The pilot , it is true, is placed upon the ship by force of
law, and without one a ship must pay a fine and proceed at her
peril.

But just as a requirerent that a vessel shall be sea-

worthy when she starts out and shall have a proper equipment,
etc.,

is for the good of such vessels as well as for the public,

so is the regulation requiring a pilot for the ship's benefit.
No vessel can know all

harbors and channels,

but a trained

pilot may be thoroughly acquainted with his own harbor and channel,and conduct a snip in safety when she could otherwise proceed only with danger.

Further,

the pilot is

liable to the

(a)

Barnes, v. The District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 546.

(b)

Sherloc.k,

v.

Alling, 93 U.S.

107.

ship for improperly piloting her,
the vessel is

not so onorous

so the burden placed upon

as at first

may seem.

The public

are best served by such a law, fierst, by their interest being
placed in the best of care and second, by iaving a responsible
party,

as the ship's owner to look to

who will usually be bettor

able than a pilot to make good any loss that may be occasioned.
The United Stases holding seems equally as just as the English
rule and is

based upon better public policy.

Wilful Negligence.
The harm may be caused by what is
negligence.

sometines c'lLed wilful

Negligence implies a lack of any intent to do

the iLarm complained of.

But here the party in

fault

brought
bs

about the collision by his own wilfull carelessness or wrong
doing.

In

a case where two vessels wilfully collide,

laid down as a dictum of the courts,
look upon them bot.

(a)

it

is

they might see fit

to

ns criminals and refuse to adjudge the loss,

leaving each to suffer the consequences of its

acts.

Certainly

as between themselves they could merit nothing from the courts,
but punishment.
(a)

If, but one of the parties was shown to be

Stur,-is, v. Clough, et al 21 1-ow. 451.
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w7ilfuliy in
for him.

Ralston, v.

case which
lision.
its

the wronr
, no protection or excuse could be offered
1
The State Rights,

serves as an excellent

The States Ri ,hts

an early

example of such wilful col-

deliberately and repeatedly ran

iron ice beak into the s;iip of' a rival

said that in

Crabe

company.

The court

such a case not only was the ship so acting,

alone

in fault, but thnt punitive damages might also be given.
In

brief,

negligence

consists of any violation

of the

rules and customs of navigation or in specific acts aside from
such rules and customs.
ion.

It must be contributory to the collis-

If no such negligence is shown, the collision must be

looked upon as caused by an inevitable accident.
mere fact

of collision

From the

, no presumption of negligence arises.
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BURDEN Oi

The burden of --roof in
upon the libeliant.

PROOF.

a case of' collision

rests first,

As has been indicated the mere fact of a

coll3l:on raises no prestuption of negligence and consequently
creates no burden.

The libellant hlas first to make out a prima

facie case of negligence on the respondents part vhich 'night
reasonably be supposed to nave in some degree contributed to
the collision.

If' there is doubt as to whether the evidence

presented is such as to make out a prima facie case for the
libellants contention, the burden has not been created and the
action must fail.

But the burden of proof does not rest on
through thle casc.

the libellant all

Having once made out a

prima facie case of negligence against the respondent,

the bur-

den then rests upon that -party to show that his negligence did
not contribute

to ti1o loss in

whole or in

a following of the general rule at law.

part.

This is

The respondent may in

turn place a burden of negligence on the libellant,
be sustained in

-

like manner.

simply

wiiich must

According as this burden is
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sustained, one, both or neither wil

be

liable.

The placing

of this burden is illustrated by any case where one vessel accuses anothlir of being in flailt for a collision.(a)
ample,

if

a ship proves that while at

_u1 !hor in

For ex-

a proper place

another ran into the anchorage ground and collided w'ith her,
negligence has apparently been shown on the part of the moving
vessel and the burden is

upon her to remove all

such iiputation.

The burden of' proof may be raised against another ship in
two ways.

First, it may be that the mere circurristances of the

collision will be sufficient when shown, to raise a presLmption
of negligence and a consequent burden without giving any further evid'nce

to connect those facts with the collision.

Second, certain facts may be sthown but, it is necessary to give
evidence connecting them with the collision as its cause.
one instance thie law raises a presumrption,

in

In

the otter it

does rot.
Violation of Rules.
A violation of a statutory regulation raises a presumption
of negligence and without further snLowing the court will usually
consider the burden as upon the one violating to prove that the
(a)

The Drew, 35 F. Rep. 789.
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negligence complained of did not contribute to tile collision.(a)
In the Conoho 24 F. Rep 758., the burden was placed upon the
respondent for a violation of the statute as to lights.
Conoho had only a white light burning w,;hich gave it
ance of being a vessel at anchor.
its

The

the appear-

An approaching vessel steered

course acr:ordingly a-rd a collision ensued.

The court said

that the burden of proof was upor, the vessel whose lights were
attacked,

to show by clear proof that her lights were properly

Placed and burning at and just before the collision.
this burden of proof',

To create

the violation complained of must have

been such as could have contributed to the collision.

The

Supreme Court has said that the mere fact of a violation of a
rule would not place tLe blmie and burden upon the one violating
where it could not possibly have had anytling to do with the
collision.

An example would be where there was no loo-out at

the time when a ship collided with a sunken hulk,

whose pres-

ence was not known and could not have been discovered had the
lookout been in

his place.

So in

considering whether tle viola-

tion of a rule would put the burden of proof upon the one
(a)

The City of "Gashington, 92 U.S.31.

49.

violating, the court may use its discretion in such instances.
However it

seems certain that nojy'

but a clear case as in

the above example, would prevent the burden from falling. (a)
Collii.on of a Ship at Anchor.
.:.erc it has been shlown that the respondent collided with
the libeliant ship ;vhen at an-chor in
is

a proper place,

the burden

at once laid upon the respondent by the aid of the presmapt-

ion that the moving vessel was to blame.
removed in many ways,

Such a burden may be

as by showing that the vessel at anchor

was not obeying the rules in

respect to lights or signals and

iL-at the respondent was navigating properly.

It

seems follow-

ing the general Admiralty rule, that even if the libellant
vessel was in fault in such matters as proper lights, signals,
a sufficient watch, etc.,

that the respondent must have used

due and ordinary care under the circumstances in order to escape
free from blanme.(b)

In a recent Federal c,)se,

(,i).

where a

collision occurred between a moving ship and a dredge at anchor,
it was considered that those facts being shown, the burden
(a)

The Farr.wut,lO Wall-

334.

The America,92 U.S -ib .

(b)

The Drew, 35 F. Rep.%I9.

(c)

The D.H. Miller, 76 F. Rep. 877.
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of proof had been met ,ind transferred
show tiat,

It

wfls

not witi-in its

prevent the collision.

to the respondent,

power by reasonable

to

care to

The presumption o,7 negligence

and

consequent burden of proof was looked upon as clearly against
the movin-r vest,3el in
at anchor.
that

It

thlis and all

was further

cases,

when one snip was

held as a rule of admiralty

law

such a presumption could not be removed by attributing

the

collision to a deceitful tide, in a harbor where the tides
were well known,

nor by the raising

of mere presuptions

suggestions of fault on the part of the libeliant.
suhi. a

burdcn the proof must at

or
To sustain

least, be as clear and decisive

as that which placed the respondents blirden upon him.
et a]. v. The F. and P.M. No.

1, 45 F. Rep. 703,

holding to the same princi-,le

of law,

in

were aground,

its

fncts.

Two propellers

had stopped their efforts to get free.

but

It

Plothmer,

is a case

somewhat peculiar
but for the moment
was plain

that they were about to make anot.er attempft.

A third

however
pro-

peller, the respondent, tried to go by them, but so near as
to be put out of course by the current, caused oy a fresh
attempt

to get free and was driven acainst

a schooner moored at
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a pier.

The fact of a collision witih the ship at anchor along

side the pier raised a strong presumption of negligence whic
was further strengtiened by the carelessness shown in approachiu- too near the grounded propellers.
was sustained. (a)

It

The burden thus raised

may be tf-at tle vessel at an.ch or is

shown to have been improperly anchored or by some other act to
have probably contributed to or' been 6nti-roly i- fult
collision.
aom
blfrme.

A burden is then upon the libellant to freo

for the
itself

This mar be the case whether the respondent has

entirely freed himself or not.
in the usual course of ships,

It" tne libellant was anchored
the ourden would be upon h1.im to

show that such an act did not contribute to the collision .(b)
Special Circumstances.
Circwflsta:'es hy be proved tihat would compel the vessel
at anchor to show not merely thpt it

was at >ichor when the col-

lision occurred, but also that damagos sustained were due to
tlhe collision and not to some outside force.
14 F. Rep. 307.

In The Maryland,

About the time of the collision, ice was

(a) The Michigan, 52 F. Rep. 501.
(b) The Armonia, 67 F.

Rep. 363.
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drifting heavily around.the ship at anchor, with a force sufficient to have ctaused the damages sustained.

Under such circum-

stances the burden was also put upon the libellant

to show tlhat

the damages were caused by the collision rather than by thle
drift inir ice.
Many other questions may be raised which the libelLant
must meet, as when passa-e was very difficult to thread,
because of a derrick working at one side, or by reason of the
tempestuous

condition of the weather, or that the ship at

anchor was lidden by some intervening object.

In

such cases

the libellant wili have the burden of showing that these conditions would not have caused the collision, had the respondent
been navigating properly.(a)

In the Passaic, 76 F. Rep. 460.,

the same rule was sustained in principle, though both parties
were held in fault.

The steamer was to blame for going need-

lessly close to the ship at anchor.

The schooner was at fault

for unnecessarily roiaining at ancn-or near a wreck on a windy
night,
tion,

in

the way of cross currents and in

and also for being in
(a)

the path of naviga-

such a position with both anchors

The Depew, 59 F. Rep.791.
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out making it

most difficult

threatened collision.

to escape in

the presence of

The burden here placed upon the libellant

by the respondent was done without the aid of any legal
presumption.
Steaiibrt -:
niing
Vessel.
I1 a ste-uri-boat and a sailing vessel collide,
is

upon the steam-boat

to its

negligence.

ship is

(a)

to show that the cllision

the burden
was not due

The reason for this is

that a steam-

:-ucn more easy to handle than a sailing vessel.

two such vessels meet,

the sailing vessel' is

Where

obligued to keep

her course and the stemm-boat to keep out of the w-,y.

The

steam-boat having nearly every advantage over a sailing vessel,
a collision occuring the burden is -laced
Prince, 67 F.

Rep.

612,

upon it.

The Gypsum

holds that the vessel which is bound

to keep out of the way must show by a fair preponderance of
evidence that the collision was due to fault of the other
vessel.

In

all

cases of a violation of the rules,

the facts

are looked upon as peculiarly within the knowledge of the
vest ;el accuse a,

so the burden is

placed uT on such a ship to

remove the presumption.
In

brief the burden of proof may be upon - vessel, because

(a)

Donnell , v. Boston Towboat Co.,89 F. Rep. 7b7.
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of a violation of the rules of navigation,

from the peculiar

circumstances of a collision, or by force of' other negligent
acts apparently the collisions direct cause.
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DAMAGES.

In

discussing the subject of' damages,

it

will be more or

less difficult to avoid treating of liability at the same time.
Damazes are t,,- be- looked upon as the cause from whichi Liability
may arise.

Tne purpose of the court is always as far as possible

to put the innocent party in the same position as before the
damages

complained of occurred.

To do this it is necessary

to know what will and wihat will not be looked upon as damages
in any given collision case.

Speaking generally, ali

injuries

ani losses the direct result of a collision will be looked
upon as constituting the damages.

In order to discover what

damages will be looked upon as direct, and how they are ascertained, it is necessary to take specific instances amd therc
find the various ite>.s allowed.
There are some kinds of loss which would usually be suffered in

a collision case,

that stnd

ing proper elements of damages,
elements is

made.

out clearly as constitut-

as soon as a search for such

Such losses would be,

the value of the ship

5E3.

whon a total loss,
injured,

the depreciated value of the ship if

cost of repairs,.

of' freight.

loss oi" cr>:o,

These forms of losz it

out plai'ly as elemeints of damage.
on further investigation.

loss to bau -age,

loss

would som, would stand
Others will be discovered

Considering the losses fron the stand-

point of the thing or person sustaining them,
generally classified,

Only

as loss to the ship,

they would be

loss to the cargo,

loss to seamen, and loss to passcngers.
To The Ship.
The loss to the ship may be to her as a ship or in her
earning capacity.

Having determined that a ship has suffered

some damages the difficulty consists in measuring them.
thle vessel is

a complete loss,

her market value at the time is
If

her home port is

collision,
taken. (a)

in order to ascertain the. damagres,
to bc taken as a proper estimate.

a suitable market,

will usually be taken.

If

her value in that port

If in a foreign port at the time of

the market value in the home port will always be
It

may be that the ship has a s]ecial value to

an owner which the market value would not include.

If

this

special value is

it

will be

re'isonably placed upon the vessel,

(a) The Laura Lee, 24 F. Rep. 483.
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allowed and damages assessed accordingly.(a)

A vessel peculiar-

ly constructed for sorme special local purpose,

or in the fur-

therance of any particular object not co .;ion

to nautical inter-

ests might well have no market value at all except as so much
lumber, while to the owner its
portion of its

wort,.

The damages suffered by the owner are

what the vessel is worth to him.

bring in
fails,

market,

timber constituted only a small

This as a rule is

it

vit

will

but there being no suitable market that method

in a case where the special value consists in thae

assumed value found in an offer of purchase not accepted, it
will not be allowed, but the mar!et price will be taken instead.
The reason for this is

that the court WisKes to avoid making

the one causing an accident, pay the price set oy another's too
high valuation.

Had the offer been accepted, but title had

not pas. ed, it would seem that such a price aould be looked
upon as properly estimating the libellant's damages, for wrhether
a hign estimate o -' not,
the collision.

it is exactly what he loses because of

If the ves el lost is a pleasure yac'-t,

method must be adopted for ascertaining its
Ilv there would not be any good ready market.
(a)

The Normandie,

58 F. Rop 427.

value,

some

because usual-

The ves el has a
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special value not obtainable at a public sale.
it

may be ascertained by considering

building and its

condition at

In

the oc,:asional

for such a vessel at the time it
ship has a

was lost.

a total

loss,

the abandonment

A good
means give

in most cases where

special value to the owner,

ed in the above manner.
(a)
Abandoned Ship.
When a ship has been abandoned at
becomie

cost of

the time of collision.

inquiry would bo what 1,vo-ld a person of suitable

the

such a case,

it

might be ascertain-

sea and has subsequently

is

not justified

mere fact of a collision caused by anoti.ers fault.

by the
Those on

board must have used ordinary courage and judgment in standing
by their

ship.

the difficulty

The court will, however, take into consideration
of the situation,

the probable danger to be

faced, if the snip is not left to her fate, as well as the
general

action of the master and his

early case,(b)

a

collision

tween two whaling vessels.
vessel

occur-ed

crew at the time.
in

The H.T.

(b)

Swift,

V.

Demock,

One ship was abandoned.

17 F.

Brownell,

Rep.

an

northern waters beAnother1

injured at the same time reached the home port,

(a)

In

226.

i Holmes 467.

althoich
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in

much the same condition as the one deserted.

ing the vesel
carefully and
damner.

Before abandon-

tho roadster and. his crew hal considered the matter
radremained by the ship in the face of great

The court considered that proper courage and judgmient

had been exercised, and that tlhe full value of the abandoned
ship shauldbe taken in estimating damages.

Had the master not

been justified in his action, the damages actually suffered by
the collision could still be considered so far as they were
due to the reslpondent's negligence.

or not an abandon-

ment was justifiable in a given case must be determined by the
special facts comnected with such disaster.
Weak Ship.
It may be found that the ship lost or injured was in a
poor and rotten condition to which condition the loss was attributable as much as to negligence on the part of the respondent.

In such a case damages would be divided, it being fully

as negligent to go about witi, such a sickly craft as to navigate in a careless manner. (a)
rhese damages fall on one or both vessels according as
one or bot. were ne_.1:c_-nt.
(a)

The John R. Ronson,

Whether or not each shall stand
86 F. ReP. 696.
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just one-half the loss is

a question of liability

damages.
Items of Damage.
When the ship injured is

only a partial

rather than

loss,

her depre-

ciated market value, if sold unrepaired, would be a proper
estimate o

dr-iages.

The cost of repairing so as to make the

vessel as good as before,

and all direct and natural expenses

and losses due to the injured condition of the ship are considered when ascertaining damages.

If

the ships injury is

the

only loss, the cost of needed repairs would constitute a correct valuation.

The ship must be completely repaired at once,

or as soon as circumstances will reasonably allow.
necessarily intervenes,

or a vcyavae is

the damaged condition of the ship,

If time un-

taken which increases

a suitable reduction must

be made for the damages thus increased. (a)
Other items of damage to the ship are towage demanded
as a necessary consequence of the collision;

a survey taken of

a vessel to ascertain its condition; demurrage, estimated in
the absence of a charter party or a marcet price by the average
net profits of the ship during the trip in
just previous;
(a)

question and those

traveling expenses of the ships owner to and

The Henry M. Clark, 22 F. Rep. ?52.
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from the wreck;

and interest,

at six-percent usually, upon

injuries sufifered and e,:Ifousos necossitatod.

(a)

Int e:e0, t.
Interest on the amount representing the sliip's loss would
run fro m t:c ti
thereto
re.

it

e of collision, but on expenses incedental

se ns to be computed from the date of such expenditu-

The giving of interest on damages rests largely in the dis-

cretioi off

the court.

Where a vessel has been put in better

condition by the repairs necessitated,

than at the time just

prior to the collision, no interest will be allowed. (b)
Salvag e expenses may be figured as a proper item of damages.
Costs of' raising a sunkert vessel, value of sails and tackel
lost, seamen's wages, and many other similar expenses may be
brought as dama!;es to the ship

The expense of tryin7 to raise

a sunken vessel is a common item of damages, so lone as spent
in good faith, even though the attempt was a failure.

Also

expenses of ascertaining the injuries to such a ship before
making any effort to raise it.(c)

If

(a)

The Oregon, 89 F. Rep. 521.

(b)

The Alaska, 44 F. Rep. 489.

(c)

The Oneida, 84 F. Rep. 716.

both vessels are to blam
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for the collision,

ference beiiic

in

the same principle holds good,

liability.

decided not to rnise it,

the only dif-

The owner of' a sulnken ship having
the respondent 'ay do so himself,

cannot it se, ms compel tie former owner to take it

but

as part cor-)n-

pensation for dwaes. Demurrage is also aliowed.
Loss of' Earnip s.
The loss suffered by a ship may be in her ecarninr

capacity.

Freigi't having been lost because of the collision,

amount

is to form a part of the damages.
allowed in suci. u cmse.

its

Probable earnings will be

The cost of hiring

another vessel to

take the place of the one injured has been favorably considered.
(a)

Also,

the difference

in

value between a c:.arter lost in

consequence of the collision and a new one granted subsequent2y.

(b)

But in a case where the ship was a total loss the

prospective catch of fish was refused as an element of damages.
The prospective c

wte.alooked upon as too uncertain.
w-s

Tie

compensation received from the inter-est alowed on. t,.e value
of the lost vessel must be looked upon as taking tile place of
any posible profit frrm

the catch of fisn.

(c)

(a)

The Emma Kate Ross, 50 F. Rep. 845.

(b)

The Bel(enland, 36 F. Rep. 504.

Had the vessel

(c) Guibert, v. The George Bell, 3 F. Rep. 581.

been in

tle

.- idst of her fishing,

and tihereby

iven some indi-

cation of what the prospective loss really was, the case might
r:ave been loo!(ed upon differently.
To The Cargo.
If the cargo is lost, the innocent owner is
-ave all

direct injuries estimated in

damages.

entitle1 to
Whether full

damages can. be recovei'-,,,-'ill depend on the statutes of limited
liability.

The vessel injured must do ali it

the ship and save the cargo from harm.
taken by th1e carryin-g shir,,

If

sur,

care is

not

dirtages that would otherwise not

stand against it,because of' the limited liabii-ty
so.

can to repair

act

,-ay do

A case of tr.is nature would be where only a small hole

admitted water onto grain or goods,

which, was not attended to.

The vessel in fault alleging such a cause, m.ust prove it.(a)
How Valued.
The cargo r.y be the property of the owner or master of
the ship or of third parties.
of the damages to be borne in
ent.

whole or in

part by t.c respond-

The value of the cargo according to Swift v. Brownell,

cited above ;1nJ. o:t,,er cases is
its

In either case it forms a part

probable value at its
(a)

to be ascertained by finding

home port,

or a crtral

The Gladiator, 79 F. Rep. 445.

lar'et

at tlhe
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time when it

would ordinarily IJAve be,

,elivered.

case the cargo was one of' whale oil and bon,
vtaL a central market for that commodity.
was not tpke

for the ascertaininW

port, or a port to whicE.

If

of vfilue,

In

this

and the Lome tort
some central market
but the nearest

the vessel was bound or might choose,

an unreasonable value would often be placed upon the car.o lost,
because of peculiar circi itances
such a ti-s.e.

In

existing at that port at

another case previously cited, Guibert,

v.

The George Bell, a cargo of fish was allowed in damages, its
vaiue being ascertained - dyhe value of tlhe fish in
port, such

a near by

port being a good market for that species. One

fourth of the value of the ship's outfit for the season also
was allowed,
season.

the ship Lavil g been out three fourths of the

Besides these damages,

custom house charges in

a for-

eiin port were admitted.
It

is

often the case that tirae is

wanted in

condition a c-'ro dmaged but not entirely
case a
that all

'easonable time is

which to re-

lost.

,liven for re oJitiomlng,

In

such a
but after

extra loss sustained must be borne by the c~rgo owners.

Vvhat would constitute a reasonable time would vary according

to the circumstances

and the article

v. Nelson, 61 F. Rep. 66S,
beer

consumed -r-nd

of sale.

in

injuz-o i.

In

AorJlinger,

more than a reasonable time had

consequence

a poorer market at the time

The loss occasioned by not beini;

reaily to

sell

with-

in a reasonable time could not figure as damages against the
respondent

L-cia_' s to car-o may be refused as against a ship

responsible

for -t collision

witn a ro

weak to go into dry-dock
be ti-e decision when it

for repairs.

e -,,

ah.ky

craft,

too

This would undoubtedly

was shown that had the vessel been fit

to be used, no injury to cargo would have occurrd. (a)
Crew and Passengers.
In a collision,
sailors
may lose their
personal effects.
Wlether the loss can be looked upon as damages de enCJ.s upon
the fault

of the ship which they help navigate.

They may have

damages ascessed in an opposite proportion to the fault of' the
If

ship.

the shil, is

be counted.
blame,

ship.

of passengers,as
(a)

in

any way to blano,

t.:en all

If partly to blame, then only half.

then niotnin>

those of his

not

A sailor's
If

fortunes

the personal

Re.

ef-'ects are

900.

If alone to

are said to follow

baggage tne owners may recover

Tine 1ew Yo_'k , 40 F.

may

tfe

property

to the full
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amount of loss against either vessel or both.(a)
Personal Injuries.
The damaes sufere,
may be to person.
T.e remedies

instead of being those to property,

These injuries

may or may not produce

for such injuries

are the same as at common law,

and on bein; estimated "Yty be allowed as damages.
jured person was a
the vessels,

it

sailor

aiding in

would seem that

rule as to - ersonal ef
for such injuries,

ects.

the dni1nvoe,

In

would follow the

order to have damages figured

the collision

must be their

1 C~rs;e
ictue
is: well illustrated

of

A skiff

was run down and the libel'iant

son drowned.
-a.i!'/

The libellant's

di~s,1e hivi for life.

to recover for

of hiimself and

(b)

What

v.

enter as
case. (b)

such- as to l-arti-

As damages the court allowed him
.is

skif f, fo

loss of its

illness,

is -rtia

Springer

The 1W.o.
viller,
\.

7. F.
Hughes,

use

loss of earnings

:oi. up to the time of the decree,

Jacobson,

Puoy

by an early

were

expenses of his

f'or nis sufferings and for
(a)

proxi:vite cause,

bo.Ay injured nr:d his

injuries

the injuries to

while being repaired,

If the in-

the navigation of one of

and o.nly actual damages can be considered.
iteL

d1eit-.

com ensation

crrm ent disa3bility.
Rep.

94U.

1 Woods

6S3.
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No damages for tihe loss of the son's life
were given.
Loss of Life.
For loss of life, by collision, the laws of admiralty
g:ive no right of' actimn and conseque-Itly :,c dnmageo
some special act of Corigress or a law existing in

the district

where tl:e coll1-ion occurred or the ship belonged.
finally decided in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.199.

mside from

This was

That case

did not clearly decide however that when such. a statute existed
a Iersr;'.1 representative might bring an action for damages.
The reason for giving damages is that it is inequitable to
do otherwise, in the case of life negligently destroyed.

In

the Harrisburg, Justice Wlaite answers this by saying that it
is

the duty of' courts to declare thle law,

not to make it.

That the law of maritime nations gives no damages aside from
statute is well settled.
the subject.

I

Congreoss has passed no statute upon

seems that when su(h a question does arise

under a state statute that the damages would be sought in per-

sonam,
in

unles; the statute especially made way for an action

rem by giving a lien upon the s,:ip in

cace in

fault.

In

a late

the Circuit Court three seamen were drowned as a re-

sult of the vessel in
Admirnlty llsw.

fault not standing by according to

Damages were given,

ti,.c aJvI-Js trators

of
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the deceased,not for the loss of life,
suffering endured before death.

but for

,LO phylic-.

That the dnages accorded

were not to be taken a-- for the loss of life,

vis expressly

stated. (a)
Previous to the decision of The

llarrisbur,- there was a

strong tendency to disregard what Common law oi±

the laws of

Admirity were as incorrorated into our legal system,

and judg-

ment was given as the equities of the c~se seemed to Je!nald.
As most of the states have by statute provided a right of action
to be brou,.ht by tie personal representative of the deceased,
any equitable objections that miTht be raised,

are

rently

modified, the Supreme Court having not yet decided that an
action under such a

my not
natute
be mnintained in Admiralty.

Speakin: in general terms, all losses the direct consequence of a collision an d which may be measured with reasonable
certainty may be figured i, items of di
of loss of life,

unless

e with the exception

-iven by some special statute.

Wrat

will be looked upon as a direct loss has been indicated.
in

any case there are more tL n two vos..els in
(a)

fault,

The Robert Graham Dun, 70 F. Rep. 270.

the

If
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damages will
ed liability.

be ascessed -pro rata subject to the rules of limit(a)

If

neither veiel

i;

in

damages are to be assebsed. (b).
(a)

The Doris Eckchoff,

41 F.

(b)

The Clara, 102 U.S.

200.

!l>.

!5(.

f'iJit,

then no
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LIABILITY.

Stating the rules broadly as to liability,
in

a collision is

neligerence.
the liability

the los.

may be either that of the cormon law in

.is

personam

ascertained by an action ibn rem 2inst

the

In the common law action, every wrong doer is included

and may be held liable for damages.
personam against

The action proceeds in

the wrong doing owner or master or cl'arter

party as the case may be.
is

oc¢'c-2icsned by

The common law rights of action being reserved,

or the liability
ship.

liable for all

the wrong doer

In

the action in

rem the ship itself

looked upon as the wrong doer and held liable.

This further

difference betw,*een the liability

at co.:mrion1 law an]d that in

miralty must be noticed,

that at comr..on law any contribu-

namely,

tory neglgence on the plaintiff's
all

liability,

very sligit
if

whl!e in

part frees the defendant from

- -tni-alty it

divides the damages or if

on the part of one .-ay not af-ect

the owner is

ad-

a wilful wrong doer,

liable not only for thelo loss to the full

0

result at all..

he will be held
value of his own
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vessel,

but for the entire damage2s actually suffered by tl~e

in-.ocont--libellant,

and no statute or rule of common law or

admiralty wil: aid him.
Subject to tbe statutory limitation of liability, the
innocent owner of a dama-ed ship may rccovor his
from t.he parties in

fault.

If

half damages c n be collected.

both are in

fault,

The cargo owner,

,Thole loss
then but
also subject

to the same statutory regulation, may recover full damages,
holding the owners of either or both of the two vessels liable
for the injuries suffered.

In

a case wthere both are liable

and one has paid more than his share,

sucr

a ship owner flas a

remedy against the other for the amount paid over and above
what was

true liability.(a)

Lis

This is

also the case where

the damages are for loss of personal property or personal
injuries.

If

pending the suit, however, one of the ship owners

purchases the claims of the owners of his cargo, he is
in

limited

his recovery from the other snip to the amount paid for

them.

The court will not force speculation of such a nature.

The cargo not being in fault c7nnot be held liable for the losses on tine other vessel,
(a)

except to the amount due for

The Dorris Eckhaff,

41 F.

Rep.

156.

accrued
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freight.

This is

the case even if

the c!,'ro owner

ind the

owners of' the ship are one.

If no statute of' limited liability

inte:fores,the cao

entitled to a complete compensation

for his losses.

ovner is
(a)

Limited Liability.
But with this general statement concerning liability
must be taken into consideration the statutes limiting liability
in particular cases.

These statutes frequently enter into a

case and entirely change the liability from what it would be
but for tiaeir existence.

Section 4283, of the Revised Statutes,

limits the liability of a ship owner for loss by collision and
otherwise, when not occasioned by any priority or knowledge
of his, to the value of his interest in the ship and freight,
then pending.
limitati

If a man has so acted as to come within this

;e is

free fro.I all

liability

so far as the rest of

his property is concerned, no matter how great the loss.

This

protects him from tiLe wrongful acts of others at whose mercy
his whole property might otherwise be placed
several owrneis,
(a)

tc

liability

The Bristol,29 F.

is
Rep.

.

If there are

to be apportioned between them
867.

7S.

according to the interest each one has in

for the collzsion.

the snip to blame

Whether the owners are one or more the

greatest sum that can be collected from
the ship and its pending freight.

them,

is

the value of

By Section 4289, of the

Revised Statutes, the privilages gran"ted by Section 4283, were
not to apply to canal-boats, barges or lihters nor any other
vessel of any description used on rivers or in
tion.

inland naviga-

But, Section 4289, was substituted by Section 4, P.494,

of the supplement Vol.I.,

which removes thie limitation and

allows Section 4283 to apply to all the vessels formerly excepted.

There seems no satisfactory reason why the exemption

from liability should not be applied to these last mentioned
vessels as well as to others.
From the fact that liability
to the sip

and the accruing freigit,

in

such cases attah..es only
it

follows legally that

wvhen a sifip is a total loss the debt against her owners through
her ias ceased to exist.
vessels is a total loss,

Dut the fact tilat one of the two
while freeing it

from further liability

does not in turn free the other vessel from its liability
toward the one so lost.

In tne 'orti. Star, 106 U.S. 17, the
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section came up for interpretation on this point.
collided and both were held in fault.
coming thereby a total loss,

Two vessels

One vessel was sunk, be-

while the other was only injured.

The damaged ship desired to avoid paying for any part of the
loss sustained by the othci- over and above its own injuries
and in support of that contention claimed theft as the vessel
sunk was freed from all further liability,
only in equal fault,were also exempt.

that they, who were

The court considered

this too broad an interpretation of the section, and held that
while the vessel sunk wasby force of the statutesfreed from
all furthe-

liability, that,

that fact did not exempt the sur-

viving ship from standing its share of the loss.

In this case

the loss would be properly shared by the surviving ves-el

pay-

ins the owner of the one sunk, half the difference between the
value of the vessel lost and the damages suffered by the other
ship.

If in such a case one ship came under the section and

the other did not,

the ownerso protected could claim its

vfnile enforcinC full liablility a-inst
vessel.

aid

the owner of tLe other

The same method of equalizing damages a.1 lies in every

similar case coming under the statute, so long as half the
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combined damages of both does not exceed the value of the sthip
upon which tLey are

imposed.

If the ship has been a total loss,

in such a case it is looked upon as surrendered to the deep,
and t-,o owner is freed from liability.

If the vessel in quest-

ion still has value, the complete yielJ1_ir

up by tue owner of

his interests in the same absolves him from all further indebtedness.

In this last caseit will be sufficient according to

Section 4285, if all interests are i:ut in the hands of a trustee
afi'ect on Wrolg. Doer.
This limitation of liability does not take away any remedy
against the wrong doer nor does it lessen any duty or responsibility placed upon the vessel by law.

It is not the laws

purpose here any more than elsewhere to protect those in fault,
but simply to

lighten the burden otherwise placed upon innocent

ship owners.

Th.is lirnitation applies against both cargo and

ship damaged by a collision under scn circumstaskccs.

The

liability as to cargo is further restricted by a subsequent
act so most of the Jisoussion relatin- to such loss will be
reserved for tnat connection.
When AppIIed.
The limitation o' liability is not to be applied until
the balance of damages has be n struck.

When botL vessels are
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in fault and both

'ile libels, the court may if it sees fit

consolidate the suits into one proceAding, and grant a single
decree.

The innocent shippers or consigners of a caro may

proccel in rem or in personam , against either vessel or its
owner.

Where a collision between two vessels has occasioned

damage to the cargo of a third snip not in
may be had in
From this it

fault,

rem against either one for the full

proceedings
loss.

(a)

appears that the limitation applies only to the

carrying ship.

A party may plead that he is

but that if he is

not liable at all,

found liable request that he be allowed the

benefits oi Sections 4283 and 4285, of the Revised Statute.
Value When Taken.
But if a vessel which has been in a collision has a right to
the privilages
when is

of Section 4283, the following question arises,

the value to be taken.

is it

at the time of reaching the end of its
if it is so l6st?

at the time of collision,
voyage,

or vi.-en sunk,

It has been shown that the owners liability

does not oxtond beyond the value of the ship after collision
and the freight

then pending,

but the time when that vralue is

to be ascertained will often make a groat difference.
City of Norwit,
(a)

118 U.S.

468,

In the

this question was fully discussed.

The Atlas, 03 U.S. 302.

In

this case a vessel was in fault tior a collision anJ. was

sunk.

Later it was raised and repaired.

o':vors

The libellant

cargo

rwanted to have the ships value taken as repaired.

court Leld however that tlh

The

value of tie s,,-ip was uslilly to

be taken at the end of the voyage,otherwise at the time of
si k1ki

- Here the v ,,ya-ewas never completed, so the ships

value was taken at the time it sunk.

Had the vessel become a

total loss by the collision as would be tho case, if it sVrk
beyond recovery, nothing could be gained in a suit by the cargo
owners against the owners of the snip for at the time of taking
its value, the vessel was worthless.

The respondents in this

case recovered insurance, but it was not lookei upon by the
court as such an interest in the snip as to be attach ble by
the orwners of' the c",r :o.

Only the value of the ship when sunk,

and the freight actually earned could be considered.
ited liability is applicable to actions
personai,.

This lim-

either in ren or in

TIP 7,wner of the injured ship must stand in the

same position as the owner of the damaged caro,

so if

the

funds realized are not sufficient to pay both, tney must share
pro rata. (a)
/,i)

,Iorwich Co.,

v. Wright,

13 Wall.

219.
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In another case tried at the same term of the Supreme
Court,

as the City of' Norwich,

the doctrine

tiat

the value of

the offending ship is not to be taken until-it completes its
voyage or is sunk, ift
to an extreme length.

tho voyage is never completed, was carried
In this case, "The Great Wiestern, 118

U.S. 520, the ship in fult was not materially injured by the
collision and startod on her voyage the same day, through her
own fault, in no way caused by injury received in the collision,
she went ashore and was wrecked.
wreck a small sum was realized.

From the materials of the
ir Insurance Company paid the

insurance on the vessel to its owners.

The majority of t,'e

court held to the strict rule and would allow the cargo owners
and others to recover only the sun realized from the sale of
wreckage, the insurance remaining with the ship owners.

A

minority of the court dissented vigorously on the ground that
the cause of the ships loss was its

own subsequent negligence

and not the collision,and that in such a c,se the ships value
should not be allowed as at the time of sinking but at the time
it would iave completed its voyage but for such negligence on
its own part.

The dissent seems fully as reasonable an
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interpretation as the prevailing opinion.
This liabilityr ol

h

vessel -ust be understood as arising

regardless of ownership.

The liability

lision and injury occur.

This is

attacheo

v,'hen the col-

the case even when a compulso-

ry pilot has been taken aboard and the collision is
fault.

(a)

due to his

such a case of' compulsory pilotage t-e ship

In

owner is not liable in personamn but in rem.
Siinken Vessel.
It is necessary to consider the liability arising against
gn owner of a sunken vessel, when another snip collides with it
and is damaged and also the liability of the vessel colliding,
if

any exists.

In

the first

case,

the gencral rule seems to

be that a ship owner may abandon his vessel when
incur no liability

sunk and

for a subsequent collision. Ceasing to

claim any property in the ship, tie loss has been caused by
nothing of his.

Certainly no liability

can then attach with-

out some special order being violated issued by the harbor mas-

ter or other competent authlorAties.
boat was left
conmissioners,

So where a sunken canal-

by the o:,ner until ordered to be removed by thepilot
the owner was not liable for a collis-on with

the hulk before suck orders were reccived11.
(a)

The China,

7 Wall.

52.

The law creats no

general duty to remove a wreck.

The harbor authorities may

remove one arid cniarce the owner for such removal aien he ',as
neglected to do so after being ordered to attend to it himself.
(a)

If the owner does not elect to treat the vessel as a

wreck,

it

would seem only reasonable,

if

'ni

in

a place wi.ere

collision would be apt to occur that some indication of its
presence be made, not only for the benefit of the ship sunk,
but in behalf of others as well.
some cases.
quireciet

This has been su,2ested in

There being no regulation by Congress, such a re-

rould have to be local.

The ship colliding with a wreck will not be held liable,
unless, there are sufficient and proper signals to give warning of its presence.

In a case, where

1.boat was sunk in a

narrow way through which ships were continually pasing and
repassii-

7h

,ourt said it was a reasonable obligation that

some signal of warning should be -iven of its presence, that it
might not be injured by collision, but that no prescrioed signals had boen fixed.

(b)

In

this case the lights had been

(a)

Ball v. Barwind, 29 F. Rep. b41.

(b)

H.S. Nichols, 53 F. 665.

81.

displayed to locate the sunken boat, and then It was further
'ujarded by a vessel on watch.

Here the boat was not abandoned.

As to what effect that would have had upon the question of
giving warning, the court does not say.
thiere to protect the sunken boat.

The signals were placed

Following the general rule,

the owner might iave abandoned the vessel without fear of liability for subsequent collisions.

The respondent whio had in-

jured the sunken boat under such conditions was held liable
for damages arising from tie c<.llision.
it was a plain case of negligence.
lessly run into.

On his part, however,

The light was seen find care-

In a case where only a mast stuck above water

to indicate the presence of a sunken ship, and a tug with an
injured vessel in tow ran into it because of the sheering of
the injured vessel, sufficient warning under the circumstances
was not considered to Lave been given , in order to render the
tug liable,in the fog which p-,evailed, the tug failed to see
the ships mast, until too late to avoia a collision.

So while

there is no maritime duty to remove sunken vesiels, in order
to prevent owners from being liable, the duty of a ship under
way not to damage a sunken vessel is practically, the same as
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in

the case of a ship at anchor if

irndicated.

its

whereabouts is

properly

The visible part of the ship or a light or buoy

to mark the spot will serve as the necessary signals to give
warning of its
presence.
CoilIIion
vith Anchor.
As to damages from colliding with an anchor which is
buoyed,

it

is

held that,if

un-

the vessel whose anchor Las cause,

the injury was acting as ordinary vessels do on the anchorage
ground,

no liability

ensues.

(a)

The case iqplied that liabil-

ity would arise where such ordinary customs wei- not followed.
Claims Against the United States.
The rule as to claims against a United States vessel for
damages in a collision is op0posite to that of England.

A claim

is allowed to be brought into the courts and if just to be
satisfied by suitable damages being given.
of t ic

Here however, none

u.sual proceedings against the vessel are allowed.

Government is looked upon as the party liable.
be rendered against such a respondent.

if

one alone is

(a)

in

fault,

No costs can

On this question The

Siren, 7'Wall. 152, is in point.
Fractional Liability.
The liability being ascertained, it is
one,

The

borne entirely by

and usually by two or more equally,

Baxter v. International Contracting Co.,

65 F. Rep.250.

if more than one vessel is to blame for the coliisiol.

But the

question arises must the two vessels in fault always share
equally as far as possible the damages caused by their combined
iiegligence, when one is not in fault nearly so much as the other.
There has been some strong dicta and also a few cases to the
effect that such a division does not necessarily follow.

If a

division is allowed according to the negligence of each, it
will apply in principle whether any limited liability is present or not.

In settling a question of liability, however, both

would have to be taken into consideration in order that it
might be properly adjusted.

In an early case, Ralston, v. State

Rights, Crabbe 22, it was said that the rule would not afjly
when the fault of the parties was "egregiously unequal".

The

Continent, 103 U.S. 710, gives siLilar dicta.
In the Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1.,
personal damagds,

an action was brought for

after declaring that both were in fault, and

that dainages were to be divided the court says:
"Wilether in

a case like this the decree should be for ex-

actly one half of tie damages sustained or might in the discretion of the court be for a greater or less proportion of such

damages is a question not presented for our determination, upon
this record

mU

we expross no opinion upon it."

This dictum certainly seems very strongly in favor of not
always adhering to the strict rule of one half damages to each
of the two in f-ult.
Rep.

395,

a case arose

broad daylight.

in the Victory v. The Plymothean,
in point.

68 F.

Two steamers collided

in

One was coming up the side of the river chan-

nel lying on her port hand, which was contrary to law.

The

other was proceeding down the river on the samo side accordin;r
to law.

The vessels were in full sight of each other and there

was plenty of roon in the channel. The vessel going down signaled, but the up coming steam-boat did not reply.
kept their course and collided.

Both vessels

Both were held in fault.

One

for obstinately disre-arding the rules, the other for making
no effort to avoid the coliLsion which was meritable from their
course if continued.

It was held that when as in this case

the fault of one vessel is extremely disproportionate to that
of the other the liability of each. may be measured by its
tributory share of negligence.

con-

The relative liability was

thought to be properly estimated in

this case by making the two
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steam-coats siharc eq' ally the harm done to themselves,
the ship most to blame,

while

should also make :_i-ocd the loss to tne

cargo to the full value of the ship,
for the remainder , iT any.

then over to the other

This case carries out the spirit

of the dictum in "The Max Mor is"1 , and establisfles the rule in
the lower Federal courts,
to fric-t are concerned.

there sug-,cted,

so far as damages

This tends to more truly make the

wrong doer liable for the reasonable consequences of his negligence than to divide the loss equally.

The courts hesitate

to so divide, however, because of the long line of precedents
where damages have beer, equally divided and also fro m the fact
that it is not easy to accurately apply such fractional iiabiliWy for necligence.

'However, it does not seem that diffi-

culty of application sholid -prevent the crurts

from giving at

least

the ',ax Mforis,

and to

appropriate justice.
riecision in

From the dictum in

The Victory,

the riclht

this manner seoms fairly well es'.ablishe 1.

to award damages

in

There is no de-

cision directly in point in the Supreme Court,

since the

ra:x

Morris.
Owners.
As to who may be looked upon as owners and thereby entitled

to this limited liability in a proper case, it is obvious that
those would be included who are commonly so classed, namely,
the holders of full or part title in the ship.
statutory owners.

There are also

The charter partiez of any ves:,el,who

victual and navigate her for a special trip,timeor purpose are
smch owners.

C'-,arter parties are specially mentioned in section

4286, of the Revised Statutes as having th.e privilages of limited liability.

Owners are also classed as general or special

according to the ihtereSt they may have in a sh.ip.

So far as a

party is owner i~c comes in for his rights ,under a limited liability

whether his ownership be that of a comnon owner or a

charter party.
Priority.
As to what constitutes priority oi' knowledge, the general
eanin:7, of the words indicate with sufficient clearness.

W7here

an owner is n vigating the sip himself as master, he will be
deemed to have had a knowledge of the fault complained of.
History oZ.
As a historical fact, this idea of limited liability
originated in the Maritime law of Europe .

The civil and common

law held owners responsible to the whole extent of damages
caused by the wrongful acts or negligence of the master or crew.
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The Maritime Law only held the owner thus liable when he was
personally to blame.

If personally free from fault as when

he had placed the ship in the hands of a competent
had equipped

and manned it

proporly,

the owner's liability

limited, both t :e amount of' his interest
freight.

in

was

the ship and

By surrendering the ship, the owner became discharged

from liability as at present.
of the

:iaster and

It

is

from this ancient custom

i:,ritime law that Section 4283, arose

this exemption from liability

.

The purpose of

was to encourage commerce.

It

was thought people would be deterred from engaging in shipping
if they wore to be made indefinitely liable by the acts of
those sailing their vessels.

An unscrupulous or careless master

or captain could otherwise easily ruin the ship'

owner-

So

the loss of ship and freight was looked upon as sufficient
liability to place upon an innocent ownerThe statutory limitation of liability so far cosidered
limits the liability for damages arising from a collision and
other ways sP,ecified to the v-ilue of the ship when there is
no priority or knowledge on thc L-art of

t,e ower-

This li-.ii-

tation, however, is not to be looked upon as taking away any
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rijht
crew

of action or remedy against a master,
q;i-en they are wrong doers,

other officer, or

nor as lessening any duty or

responsibility laid upon ti.e owner by law.

The statutory

provision for limited liability, just considered applies to
liability

for both ship and cargo injured.

The next act to

be noticed affects only the cargo on the carrying ship and
such -i sh-ips consequent
Harter Act.

liability.

The act so limiting is

the
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HARTER ACT.

The Harter Act, 27 Statutes at Large, P. 445, limits still
further the liability of an owner of a vessel.
"That if

Section 3,

siy5:

the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise

or property to or from any port in the United States of America
shall exercise due diligence to make said vessel in all respects
seaworthy and properly manned,

equipped and supplied,

neither

the vessel nor her owners,agont or charterers shall be responsible for damages or loss resulting from faults or errors in
navigation or management of said ves. elnor shall the vessel,
her owner or owners, charterers or agent,or master be held liable for losses arising from dangers of the sea or other navigable waters,acts of God,or public enemies,or the inherent defect,
quality or vice of the thing carried or from insufficiency of
package or seizure urider legal process,or for loss resulting
from any act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods his

agent or representative or from saving or attempting to save life
or property at sea or for any deviation in

rendering such service.
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This act as a w±;ole is to be looKed upon as a compromise
betweon t!e cr-,::on carrier
calried.

The first

on water and the owner of goods

part of Section 3,

includes the most of

what is directly in point in a case of collision.
place., it r ust be understood

that

this

section applies only to

cargo on Ooard and not to pas -enkcr2
-e
as cargo.

In the first

ba,7gae not

shipped

So if a passenger is injured or baggage destroyed

in a collision, caused as indicated in the above section, the
liability remains just the same, as before the

ict

vas passed.

One or both ships, make good the loss sustained according as
one or both are in fault.(a)

Further, the section is to be

understood as applying only to the cqyin- vessel and its
cargo, and not to the other ship and cargo

in collision.

The

principle that when both are in fault, damages must be divided
and tile innocent cargo owner recover his whole loss from either
vessel is

to be followed as closely as possible

consi6tcn t

with

the act.
By this section, it is not to be understood that there is
any intent

to rolcase one vessel at

tne

(a) The Posendale, 88 F. Rep. 324.

expense of the other.
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Th.e liability

of t:

nther ship remains unchanged,

directly
benefited by the section.
No Offset.
Tihis sct,*ion :ives no right
of offset
ing vessel.
ity

when two

not

the carry-

That would,if allowed, create an indirect liabil-

for part at least

the above

against

if

of' the loss accruin& to the cargo under

circumstances.

Such an offset

ships have been in

collision

would be given,
anJ both were in

if

fault,

the vessel which was not carrying the cargo should be allowed
to set-off against the carrying vessel, damages up to one rnalf
of tie

nalf

injured.
tation

damages
But

it

had been obliged to pay for the cargo

the cases distinctly

deny that

any sucl

interpre-

was intended by those framing the act.

Owner's Liabil ty.
The liability of the vessel and owners, is not lessened
except

in

respect

to the cargo on board the carrying

Otherwise it remains tile sa me as by Section 4283.,
the Rcvised

statutes

the Supplement.

and Section 18,

P.

4,C3,

ship.

and 4285 of

of the Ist.Vol.

The cargo owners must stand cr.arged under this

act with so much of the damages to the cargo as the carrying
ship is

of

relieved from,

in

so far

vont arky increasing of tne liability

as that is

necessary

to pre-

of the other vessel.
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A good exa mple of the ;working of this statute, is seen
in The Niagara, 77 F. Rep. 329.,
discussed.

wuiere the act iS

Two vessels collided in a fog.

carefully

Both were found in

fault. The Hales was a complete loss, both ship and cargo,
while tLe Niagara was but slightly injured, in ship and none in
cargo.

The Hales was worth $16,000, and her cargo $2G,000.

The Hales was looked upon as coming within the influence
the Harter Act,

section 3.

Damages bein'

ship's loss, the Hales received $8000.
cargo owner for

divided

of

as to the

But for the act, the

whom the Hales was the carrying ship could get

the $ 8000 to make good

is

damages.

act, the $8000 must be nis loss.

As it was, by force of the

Having apart from the act,a

riht to sue either offending vessel for his full damages
suffered, he could recover from the Niagarf

$ 8,000, but no

more, as a greater amount would increase the burden upon that
vessel making it

.eavier, because of this section, which was

not deemed to be its intent.

S o the burden of loss, to the

extent of the $8000., fell on the cargo owner.

In this way tho

liabilities of the Niagara was not increased.

But for the

statute,

the money that went to pay the sales'

half

dnmages for

total loss would have been paid to the cargo owner.

The

carr'ier's burden is t;.erefore, made lighter by means of this
Act.

The Viola, 60 F. Rep. 296, is one of the first cases upon

Section 3.
In the Ircrawaddy, 171 U.S. 187, the force of the Harter
act was considered where a general aver-e had arisen.

It was

decided that the Act did not let the offending ship into a
general average with the cargo the same as for sacrifices subsequent to stranding or colliding.

The main purpose of the

act is to relieve the ship owner from liabijity for latent
defects not discoverable by the utmost care and diligence,

and in the event that he has exercised due diligence to make
his vessel seaworthy to exempt him fro- responsibility for loss
due to errors in navigation, but not to allow tiLe owner of the
guilty ships to skare in

a .eneral

average.

Having shown the general effect of the Act, Section 3,
interpretation of so-me special pLases may make
clear.

the

its meaning more

The words "to or from any Yort in the United States",

apply not only to vessels going to or from or between such ports
as New York and Boston,but as well to ships plying between two
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places on the same bay.
mid

It is given "a broad construction

a-plies to all vessels carrying mercLandise to or from any

port under Federal Government jurisdiction."
in San Francisco Bay.

(a)

Such a case arose

Whether due dilligence i-s benr

exercise1 in any case to make the vessel"seaworthy etc.',' is a
question of fact to be decided in each instan-e as it arises.
A vessel is properly manned. if a sufficient and competent crew
is aboard, though at the time of collision, a lookout may not
be in his place or a proper officer on deck.

Equipment and

supplies are sufficiently provided if the ship is properly
equipped and supplied on starting out, and possessed of a
reasonaole amount of material with which to repair.

As an ex-

ample a mechanical fog-iLorn is out of order, and a collision
ensues.

If the owners furnished a proper horn and material

to repair it with, if needed, they have properly equipped the
ship in that respect, and may come under the Statute.

Whether

or not the loss caused was due to a fault or error in navigration
or managemer,t of - vessel is also a question that must be decided in
(a)

each

insta1ice

aided by the rules and fixed customs of

In re Piper,etc.,

Co., 86 F. Rep 670.
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the seas,

harbors,

rivers or lakes,

where the case arises.

.. either t'P limitations of liability
of the Revised Statutes nor the Harter Act

under the sctons
ern be

looked upon

as allowing a ship to exempt itself by contract from liability
for its

owrn negligent acts causing a collision and damage to

cargo.

Such contracts are looked upon as contrary to public

policy, and the court will not enforce them, but hold the
coint2acting vessel responsible for its negligence.(a)
is

simply a setting forth of the gerieral rule in

coTmmon carriers, on land or water(a)

The Guildhall,58 F.

Rep.

796.

This

respect to

PRIORITY OF LIENS.

Having discovered the liability

of a ship for damag-es

arising from a collision, it is next necessary to consider the
nature of that liability.
Nature of Lien.

Dj ..iages having been proved for wnich the respondent vessel
is

liable,

a lien attaches to the ship in favor of the injured

and successful libellant.

This lien attaches to and follows

the negligent ship wnerever sre -oos.
enforced by an action in
forcement of a lien,

This maritime lien is

rep. Throughout an action for the en-

the ship is

treated as the offending party

and arrested by tl-e order of the Court.
only to tihe ship,
earned

ai it

The lien attaches not

but also to her tackel,

at the time of collision.

furniture an.- freight

The lien following a vessel

does wenever the same may go,

force of - lien at Common law where it

is

just contrary to the
is

lost as soon as out

of possession which would usually consist in bein,- out of port.
Form of Atio.
The nature of the proceeding in rem is as elsew.ere, a

proceedkin.

against the res,

the ti.ing, the siiip,

for the arrest of the vessel itself.

whicl accounts

In Common Law Courts it
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has been the custom to treat vessels as person; l
ject to attacl.ment

and execution,

persons wiiose legal ri~i'ti
nave invaded those rigri.ts.
the suit are included.
interest in

liniting

sub-

sui.t to tre

have been affected and those w1.o
in

But in

Chancery,ll interested in
Admi-rait:,

thie subject of the action,

ently appear mn
rem,

but,

.rceorty,

propound his suit.

To

ali wLo have an

the res,
;iv

may independ-

juri.sAiction in

there must i-ave been an actual and valid seizure of the

ship by the -iarsnall of the court.
Priority Determined.
Having such a lien upon a ship,arising from a collision,
whichI

can be thrus enforced,

it

becomes necessary to know what

relation it bears to other liens of the sane or a different
nature:

First, as to liens of the same nature.

Two liens

at+.ach for damages to the ship and cargo, caused by a collision,
in wnich the same vessel was an offending party.
at the same time,
them,

and are of the same nature,

If they arose

those 1.cldinz

must be looked upon as possessed of equal ri;L ts against

the silip in
junior lien,

fault.

If

one is

prior in

tinougn otherwise tLe s:e,

time to the other,
-ast

the

:Live way to that

which is senior provided that no sucd time has passed as to
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deprive the possessor of the prior lien of his right of action.
(a).

But where the contention is

one of priority as between

liens of a different kind, many questions arise as to which
shll take precedence.

Priority in any given case, is to be

determined always by ascertaining the liens nature, unless they
are found to be of the same nature, then the one first in time
has preference as previously indicated.

It is intended here

only to consider the priority of such liens as

would usually

arise when a collision has occurred.
Damage Lien.
The lien usually most prominent in all collision cases, is
that for damages. To determine its priority is therefore of
first importance.

In

doing so the other liens will of necessity

be discussed, thereby giving the priority of them all.
what other liens a damage lien should take precedence
been some conflict of decisions.

Over
there has

That damages should have pref-

erence over a lien for repairs, ti-lere is no great doubt. (b).
There was for a time some dissent to this, but it (c) has been
(a)

The Frank G. Flower,

(b)

The Pride of the Ocean, 3 F. Rep. 161.

(c)

The Amos L.

Carver,

17 F.

35 F.

Rep.

Rep.

653.

665.
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OVer-rued by the

.

courts,

and disregarded by subsequent

decisions Oy courts of the same authority.

It also t'>kes pre-

cedence over mortgage liens,bottomry and respondentia Oonds.
In the J.G. Stevens, 40 F. Rep. 331, it was held that a maritime lien for damages arising from a collision takes precedence
of liens for repairs and supplies, although the latter liens
arose prior to the disaster.
the Amos D. Carver.

The court here refused to follow

The reason for !-ivin.: such a lien preced-

ence is that the person suffering the damages has no option to
omploy arid no caution 'hich it is possible to exercise which
the creditor on n mortgage,bottomry or respondentia bond
Such a creditor may con_,ider all

has.

the possible risks and ad-

vance n:is money, material or supplies accordingly.

He Las an

alter]ative while the libellant for collisicn damages, has none
at all, the damages bei-W forced upon him by the negligence of
others.

Such a preference

relations.

It

is

is

to be further

renerally Lad over all
ioticed

that the fact

ex contractu
tiit t1o

libellant is also sorec:hat in fault, will not have any affect
on the priority of such damaces as
despDite such neglect.
(a)

(a).

-(,as a r' -nt to collect

These decisions leave no doubt as

The Jonn G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113.
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to the priority of damage liens over those for prior repairs,
supplies, money loaned with a mortage as security and in general all liens ex contrictu except wf:
-es.

Whether or not a damage lien should take precedence over
one for seaman's wages was for a time vigoroizsly dispited.

The

previous decision of' the Supreme Court did not satisfy some
judges,
Co.,

as being in accordance witi. mar1ti.ie law.

in Norwich

v. Wright, 13 Wall. 210, it had been laid down that pref-

erence should be Eiven to the damage lien.

In the Amos Z.

Carver, 35 F. Rep. 665, Justice Brown did not follow the previous Supreme Court decision, but instead g-ve preference to
the lien for mariner's wages.

In The Daisy Day, 40 F. Rep. 538,

it was held that : maritime liei- for damages, arising from a
collision caused by negligent towage must yield to
seaman's wages, if the seamen were not in fault.
distinctly refused to follow 1orwich Co.,
ed

i

lion for

The Court

v. Wright, which plac-

damage liens first, because the Jecision was considered

contrary to tliC Admiralty law of the United States.
agreed with the decision in The Amos D. Carver.

This

There was here

an implied holding that if the seamen were in fault that this
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prefcrerce wo.Ild not exist.

Iin two later Federal cases, the

courts took a different position.

In

these cases,

The F.H.

Stmiwood, 49 F. Rep. 577, and The Nettie Woodward, 50 F. Rep.
224,

it

wta

held that a maritime lien for damages arising from

a collision caused by negligent nn,,igation, had precedence
over a lien of tlhe crew of the offending vessel for wages earned 1.rior to tiie collision, but subordinate to their liens for
wages earned on board subsequent to it.

The lien for wages,

does not apply merely to mariners who serve the ship with peculiar
nautical skill, but extends to all whose services are in furtherence of the main object of the enterprise in which the ship
is engaged, such as engineers, deck-hands, firemen, captain,
mechanics,

carpenters,

porters and others.

In

the conflict

of decisions on this question of priority of damage liens over
those for mariner's wages, the later c?-ses as well as the
majority of them seem to give precedence to the lien for damaeo;,
to do so is certainly carrying out more strictly the idea that
a seaman's fortunies follow those of his ship.
in the wrong,

If his ship is

he must wait until th.ose wrongs i:,ve beern proper-

ly copensated.

As a rule, lions for seaman's wages also take
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precedence ovor claims ex:-contractu.
sist

in

The reasons for this con-

the general reckless itature of sC-PCe',

the ease with

which they are imposed upon, and a desire to save theic wages
for them.
dent

The reasov

why their wages earned prior to the acci-

should give place to the lien for dmageos s,,F...r.

ship and cargo in a collision, rest ulpon two grounds.

by
First,

the seamen are usually in some degree to Olame for the acts of
the offending vessel,

so from considerations of public policy,

it is sought in this way to discourage negligence on their part
while navigating.

a fund impouride'
the

Second,

it would be inequitable to permit

to compensate for a wrong, to be deserted to

pay,,ment of a participant in the wrong or to one having a

remedy against the owner of the offending vessel denied to the
owner of

ti.e shil', dfttia-d.

no remedy other

In

than that of a

The F.H.
lien

Stanwood,

against

the owner had

the offending vessel

because of the effect of thelimited liability given by Revised
Statutes, 4283.

There the above reasoning strictly applied.

Adniraltr L~w follows the doctrines of equity so far as it is
possible.

It

is

a

settled principle of equity tiat

wrhere one

party has but one remedy and the other has several that the

latter will be remitted to his additional remedy and not be
allowed to select the only remedy the first

person has, when

by so doing a just claim would in whole or in part be left unsatisfied.

Following this principle the mariner would be ob-

liged to yield to tho lien for d-maes,

so far as his lien

against the ship would in any way conflict with an injured libellantb ri hts.

Justice Brown who had taken the opposite view,

later recognized the weight
stated above.

and authority of the decisions as

So the doctrine laid down in Norwich Co.,

Wright, 13 Wall. at

122,

v.

seems to be clearly sustained by the

latest decisions in the Federal Courts.

What the Supreme Court

would do with the question, if it arose there again, does not
appear, but it seems reasonable to suppose that it would follow
its previous holding which gave priority to the injured libellant.

It was thought in the F.H. Statwood that the decision

in the Daisy Day, as to mariner's wages being -iven precedence
where the crew was not to blame, would have been different, had
the case of The J.G.

Stevens then been decided and brought to

the notice of the court.

The rule thus deduced is

that the lien

for mariner's wages rives way to the lien for damages so far
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as wa-os earned on board the offending ship,
lision are concerned,

and tLat the wages take precodence, if

earned after the loss.
at all

in

fault

The question as to the crews not being
but little

raises

prior to the col-

doubt,

since they .ave

other

remedies.
Salvage Lion.
As to all
ship,

there se

other liens that might possibly attach to a
1is

no roo'n for any other conclusion than that a

lien for damages caused by negligent navigation takes precedence in

every case,

except in

and daia,age ensutes.
not to blame,

Two ships collide

Both of the vessels are injured.

and also the goods it

the offendin- vessel.
same vessel.

that of Salvage.

The vessel

carries h.ive a lien upon

But a salvar also has a lien upon the

It may have existed at the time of collision

for some previous act of salv~a,-,

or it

-ay accrue after the

collision and be due to damages suffered thereby.
the only difference,

Practically

the fact that the salvage lien wac. prior

in time could possibly make would be if the two liens were ever
looked upon as of equal importance.
the older lien must as elsewhere,

If

sucl was t.e

cvse -.ere

have priority unles,; by laches
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such a benefit had been lost.

But aside from such a supposed

condition of things arising from the possibility of the two
liens being considered of' equal importance, an answer to one
case would be a]rpro riate to the other.

The Salvor's lien

seems to be one of the most highly t'avorc d.

But for

i.is inter-

ference, there often would have been nothing for the liens of
other parites to attach.

This would always be the case where

the liability of the vessel in fanit is satisfied by its total
loss,

and but for the salvor's assistance,

have occurred.

such a loss would

The salvor often displays grent bravery,

risk-

ing -is own life in saving the property or lives and property
of others.

That such bravery or ever, any act, saving the prop-

erty of others should be made sure of its reward, certainly
seems most just and reasonable.

By the holding in

thie Nettie

Woodward, salvage liens and liens for damages were put on the
same basis so far as their priority over mariner's w'vves was
concerned.

Both must give place to wages earned subsequent to

the collision.

While no case directly in

point appears,

the

general tone of the cases seem to give s!.
vage services a prior
lien over every other, except that of mariner's wages
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subsequently e'i.rned.

Froi the conditions under which the ser-

.
vices are rendered and the necessary adva -itae acer'i

_W

there-

by to other lien holders as well as from the general tone of
the cases,

it

would sexn thAt a salvage lien should be given

such priority unless in some way rest-ictea by contract or lachesA
General Averag.
General Average may be recovered as damages from the wrong
doing vessel.

As such a condition of things may arise and be

of considerable importance in a collision case, it should be
here considered as a lien and its priority.

A case of General

Average w.ould iave occurred where a vessel after being in
collision without fault was obliged to cut away

broken spars

or jettison part of the cargo in order to keep the ship afloat.
This beli-,:o,

for the common safety of ship and cargo, would

demand that a general average be hsJ, average char,-os incurred
by a cargo owner may be recovered as damages caused by collision
and a lien for such charges attaches.

Like all

other liens,

it must give preference to mariner's wages earned subsequent to
the collision.
bond,

It certainly takes precedence over a botto,,ry

and rioney lent to pay it

may have the same priority as
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the lien which it

paid.(a)

Such a lien by the ship in

colliS-

ion cases usually becomos absorbed as part of the damages sufferod and takes place along with a lien for damages.

If

by

the cargo owner, the lien would probably take a similar position,
as it

repr'cIts

dam-aes sustained by him.

In

a case where a

lien for direct damages and one for general average expenses
were brought against the same vessel,

there seems no reason why

one should not have the same priority righ ts as the other,
both arose from a collision.
the result of a collision,

if

1f the general average was not,

but arose in

some other way,

as by

reason of a storm, it would seem that what ever preference was
given, should be to the damage lien arising, because of the
negligence of the ship upon wlaich it at-aches, rather thln to
the averaze lien which arose as much for the protection of the
holders prop erty as

or the one who threw it overboard in aid

of common safety.
The courts in

discussing the advisability of allowing

average charges as damages have said that there seems no sound
reason why both general and particular average charges should
(a)

The Dora,

34 F.

Rep.

3.
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not be recovered as a part of the damages.

They are a direct

result of the collision, for witliout it they would not have
occurred.

The rule of damages is said to be "restitutio

integram.

in

Such a rule clearly demands compensation for such

charges arising as they do directly from the collision.
The same might be said in

(a)

substance concerning a lien for re-

pairs or for salvage services, for being paid such liens become
items in the amount of damages

suffered.

Some special atten-

tion has been -iven to this matter in conn:ection with general
average, because of the energy with which at times it Las been
opposed as entorin; an& forming a part of the damages.
satisfactorily answers the case where both1

This

arise from the col-

lision, but as to the case where the average lien stands boldly out by itself, the courts are not so clear.

It would seem

that such a lien must yield to one for damages for the reason
previously given.
Repairs.
A vessel having suffered damagc in a collision and been
repaired, a lien attaches to her for her value of repairs
(R)

The Energid, 66 F. Rep. 604.
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rendered.

This lien is not lost by merely delivering the ves-

sel to the owner before the payment.
a prorrietary

right,

It

is

in

the nature of

and follows a vessel until such a time

has lapsed as will be looked upon as marking its

etinguishment.

Generally speaking, such a lien must yield to a lien for salvage, damages by collision, mariners wages, general average or
This is

bottomry and respondentia bonds.
viously cited in

another connection.

(a)

sho%%rn by casos preThe Felice while not

a case wnere a coliision had occurred is a good illustration
of the law on ti-he question.

After admitinr

the general rule

that a bottomry bond lien would have preference, the case hold
that such- priority would not be given where the holder of the
bond has been guilty of delay in enforcing it or of some action
tending to induce repairs to bc
'the

given by which the value of

s1ip hial been greatly increased.

By this it

may be seen

that these rules concerning priority of liens may be rendered
insufficient because of outside circumstances.

On the other

hand, lions for repairs take precedence over a lien for unpaid
(a)

The Pride of the Ocean,

3 F.

Rep.

The J.G. Stevens, 40 F. Rep. 331.
The Felice,

40 F.

Rep.

653.

161.

110.

preliums of inslirance,

and are on the same footing with a lien

for supplies furnished in

a homo port

given in a foreign port.

If the mastor is personially l

,

1 en tne repairs were
ble,

the lien for repairs takes precedence over the lion for the
master's wa-os,(a)
an injured vessel,

also over towage,
but if

where it is for towing

the services had been rendered to

a vessel injured by a collision so as to need such services
more than would usually bo t.e case,

they would probably be

classed as salvage services and take priority.

In short, the

cases seem to show that a lien for repairs has priority over
all

other liens exce Ut those mentioned above as taking preced-

ence,

or at most only yielding an equal right to others unless

laches have occurred.
These four classes of Admiralty liens arising from dm'yes,
to ship and cargo,

salvage services,

general average and a

lien for repairs are teho only liens of importance that are
liable to arise from a collision.

Others may attach,

a rule they could all be brought under one of these
heads,
(a)

and their priority deterlinted t.creby.
The Daisy Day,

40 F.

Rell.

5, B.

but as
cncral

The relation as
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to priority
first,

in

these four cases

Damages

injured siiip,

second,

seems to be Salvage
third,

General Average

services

and ropiirs

to an

fourth.

As between Maritime and Domestic liens, the former must
always have priority.
Divesting of Liens.
These liens may lose their priority or become entirely
divided in several ways.
always discharges it.
its

priority

subsequent

Proper payment of R lien of course

A lien

by laches.

may also be extinguished or lose

The priority

lost

purchaser or encumbrancer

in

would be as against

good faith.

The laches

may however, be excused if explai-ned in a satisfactory mannerA lien may also be divested by a judicial

sale of a vessel,or

an action in rem, or by a private sale justified by necessity.
Also by a taking of collateril

security under a special

agree-

ment to divest,

and finally

this

the destruction may be complete as w:.on totally

last

case,

burned or lost
ship as sucl.,

at sea,

by a destruction of the vessel.

or it

the ccnponent

into another structure.

In

may only be a destruction of' the
parts
either

still

existing,

case the lien

but built
is

lost.

In

a
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A lien is not divested when a delay is excused,nor when
a private sale is not justified by necessity, nor by taking
commercial paper for it whicrI turns out worthless.

A vessels

departure from port does not divest any lien, except wharfage,
so far

as it

has a

standing in

Admiralty.

vest by an assignment of the claim.
lien is

:1or does a

lien

The rigiht to enforce

simply changed from.i one to another-

As there is

dithe
nothing

peculiar about a lien's divesting connected with it because
arising from a collision, it does not seem necessary to discus.;
the matter here,

more than to show generally,

as has been done,

the conditions under which liens will and will not divest in
Admiralty.

All Admiralty

liens have i-ot been discussed,

only those which would be most likely

to arise

in

but

collision

cases.
State Liens.
It remains to say a few words concerning liens given by
State Statutes and tiheir relation
from collisions.

to Adyiralty liens

arising

Concerning these leins it is neces-ary to

observe that none can be thus given which will

in

any way

1i.

interfere with liens in Adr-iralty.

T

tl~e lien

so conflicts,

the domestic or State lien must yield priority to ali liens
maritime.

T! not in such conflict, a stpte lien may be enforced

in Admiralty,
priority is

but it

cani have no place except at the foot when

considered.

These local or State lien laws are

not regarded as amendments to the general maritime law.
ever,

How-

in the absence of a- act by Congress establishing a uni-

from rule in such cases, and also in the absence of any conflict between them and the laws of Admiralty, they vii be upheld as against vescls engaged in foreign and interstate commerce,

owned in other states as cell as against

withmin the State. (a)

It

I.s

owned

was the Constitutional intent to have

a harmonious system of' rulec for all Admiralty cases, collisions

and otherwise,

so in order to be consistont with that intent,

the above aprlication of State laws must be adhered to.
A lien by State Statute is lost by t e departure of the
vessel from port,

the same as at Common Law.

At Comcheri law

a lien for damages by collision has long existed.
(a)

The Del Notre,

90 1. Rer

=

TUG AND TOW.

Many collision cases arise w:uere a tug and tow are either
parties libellant or respondent.

The collision m_,y

c(.,ur be-

tween the tug and tow themselves, or between one of them and
some t1-ird vessel or object.

One, both or neither may be lia-

ble as in any case of collision.
partial control of the tug.
of the +;

The tow may be under full or

Where it is under the full control

and a collision occurs, the presumption is in favor

of the tow against the tig.

The tug having control of the tow's

movements it is only reasonable to presume that a collision
occurred through its

fault.

However,

this presumption is

re-

butabie, as by showing thiat the fault was some act of the tow
or some outside force over wnich the tug could not reasonably
be expected to have control.

A tug in control of the tow is in

duty bound to anticipate the time and place and perils of the
ordinary action of the tide or well known river currents.

The

tug also will be liable for so passing another vessel tijat the
tow becomes disturbed by the suctioh of the wheel of the ship
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passed and collision occurs, or in any other way

causes a

dangerous situation to arise from which damage to the tow or
to the tow and a third vessel accrue. (a)

Where the control

of the tug and tow is divided equally or practically so, it
would seem that between themselves no fault would arise against
eitherFull Control.
The tow mn y be in

full control, using the tug merely as

its motive power, as an agent for that purpose.
case if

such a

tug and tow collide, certainly no presumption of fault

can arise against tho tu , but rather against
was in

In

the tow,

which

control of the movements of both ships.These general

principles laid down as applying when the tug and tow collide
with each other also apply in

any case of collision where a

tug and tow is concerned and an at emipt is bein; made to fix
the liability upon one or the other-

Both beinS in faultlia-

bility
falls
upo,'i both.
Are One Vessel.

In Admiralty law, tug and tow are looked upon as one vessel,
when a third s iip is
both are liable in
(a)

injured and their fault not being explained,

damages which will be divided between t201.

The !-'ariel, 32 F.

Rep.103.
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The showing that one or the other was in
to shift the burden of proof.

full

control,

seems

Not only are the tug and tow to

be looked upon as one ship in law, but it seems that they are
to be considered as a steam-ship.

The propelling power is

steam, so the ship must come within tfie gencral definition of
a steam vessel.

A tug and tow must keep out of the way of a

sailing vessel as would a steam ship, but the same strict
count of liability is not required.

ac-

An adherence to the rules

for steam ves.els is demanded with a reasonable amount of consideration given for the necessary difficulties attendant upon
such navigation.

Where a tug and tow meet a schooner, the

schooner is not freed from all care.

She too, must look out for

herself, and take such precautions as the circumstances require.

The tug is not in all cases held to the strict respon-

sibility of a vessel under steam with movements unimpeded.
Where the sailing vessel comes needlessly near or tries to cut
across the tow,

the tug can not be held to blame, being unable

to escape. (a)
Tugz
Unnecessarily Encumbered.
If the tug itself
unnecessarily increases the inconvenience
(a)

The Page,

36 F Rep.

329.
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under w-lich it

is

placed by tile presence of a tow,

it

must use

a commensurate degree of care according to the risk assumed.
An example of this would be where a tow was very
consequence it
in

such a case,

long and in

was impos.;ible to as readily avoid a collision.
the tug often wishes to raise t.:e increased in-

convenience as a defense, but it is not allowed to do so, having
needles:31:r created the extra impediment to its

itself
tion.

When a third vessel has boo,

(a)

naviga-

to blame the tug will

only be required to show that it has done its duty and fulfilled its contract of towage toward the tow.

This, however, in

no way excuses the tug and tovr fron using every precaution
under the circumstances.
of the Offending vessel is

This is true even though t.e fault
flagrant.

(b)

In order to hold a tug liable for damages done to or by
its

tow,

it

have assimed the con-

must actually or impliedly

trol of towage.
and without its

So in a case when a tu- had two boats in line,
knowledge a third boat attachez

tow so unskilfully

itself

to the

as to soon break away and collide with the
'gnitney, 86 F.

Rep.

697.

(a)

The H.N.

(b)

The Maria Martin, 12 Wall. 31.
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libellant's vessel, no liability can rest upon the tug.

A con-

tract to tow had not been assumed even implied by such a case,
is alone to blne. (a).
Part Control.
Wnen both tug and tow are in
movements,

partial control of their

and a coliLsion with some third ship occurs,

may be held liable.

If

both

both tug and tow had clear olportunity

to avoid a steamship or other vessel and t:ne tug did nothing
to prevent the collision and the tow in
course taken or in

no way objected to the

any other manner took{ any precautions, both

will be looked upon as liable unless the apparent fault can be
explained.(b)

As a general rule it

may be said that if

the

tow sees or ought to iave seen and objected to the course of
the tu. and did not, it
in

the negligent

acts of the tug, whenever another vessel has

been damaged. thereby.
ticipate in
and,

if

will be looked upon as having acquiesced

Where trie crews o.' both tug and tow par-

the navigation of the two ships,

found in

fault,

both may be sued

held liable the same as though they

were ships navigating separately.

The damages are divided

(a)

Steamboat Co., v. Steamboat Co., 32 F. Rep. 798.

(b)

A. Chase,

31 F.

Rep.

91.
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between the-r,

with the umderstanding that if

one is

not able

to pay its share of the damages the other must. (a)

Tug and

tow may however, always be sued as one vessel, and, if

either

is innocent, that one may be freed froi responsibility. (b).
When the crews act jointly in
is

sufficient

navigating the tug and tow,

it

to show that the collision occurred by their

negligence while so acting, in order to hold both liable.
Agents of' each vestel are implicated in

the negligence complain-

ed of, thereby rendering their ship re31nnsible.
Tow in Control.
Tnae only cases where a tow can be held in fault having
been properly accepted by the tug are when some control of the
navigation remains in

its

hands.

This is

the case when a

master or pilot is left on board or the crew as mcntioneQ

abovQ.

or where the tow herself attended to the fastening of the tow
line, or the snifting of the sails,
partly under her own steam.

or when she is

The tow's liability

or only partial as above indicated.

proceeding

may be complete

Examples of where it

complete are such as the Carfloat, No. 4, 89 F. Rep. 877.
(a)

The Virginia,97 U.S. 309.

(b)

The Restless, 103 U.S. 699.

is
In
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this case,

a steam ship _came up to a wharf under Ier own steam

and in charge of her own pilot, assisted by tugs.

Because of

her recklesness the steamship collided with a carfloat and
There was sufficient freedom to permit sliiu independ-

sunk it.

ent action as was necessary to create a collision by her own
act,

aid no fault was shown

Law 26 F. Rep.

164,

on the part of the tugs.

In the

the master of the libellant tow handled her

sails improperly which caused the ship to go wrong.
was in no way liable.

The tug

The tow having seen fit to so set her

own sails must stcind the results of her fault.
Suit by Tow.
When the tow is attempting to recover for its damages, it
may sue the t,,

alone or tne tug and any third ship in fault.

The tow in such a case is
an agent.

If it happens that the tow of one tug coLides witL

the tow of another,

both tugs may be libelled in the same pro-

ceeding, but the burden is
ligence against both.
thus suing,
be , if

not bound by the tug'vs acts as those of

cn

upon thej libellant to establish neg-

As against the tug not its

be in no better position than its

bringing the action.

This is

own the tow
own tug would

not on the grounds of

agency, but because of the fact that in law, tug and tow are
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looked upon as one vessel.

So to the extent her tug is

fault,
the tow cannot recover
Breaking of Tur and Tow.
In cases of sudden peril,

against

in

the other vessel. (a).

when anything

about the tug and

tow breaks in attempting to avoid collision, no presumption
is

raised against

the t1i

ayid tow from that fact.

A tug is

towing by a "bridle" which breakes under a sudden strain caused
by the tug's
The tug
ous in
it
cy,

ii

starboardinz
not

using a

looked upon as acting in
"bridle",

was insufficient.
it

to avoid an approaching vessel.
a way of itself

so proof will be required

use.(b).

to show that

The "bridle" snapping only in

will be presixmed to have been strong enougx
The fact that the lashings between tu;

danger-

an emergenfor general

and tow along

side gave way when a tug stop1 ed suddenly to avoid the libellant
ship which had placed itself
that of the ship in

in

placing

the tug and tow in

as to demand unusual action,
lashings. (c)

the same manner.

causing extra

st-ain

The fault

such a position
on the

On the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River,
Dayton,

120 U.S.

37.

(a)

The L.P.

(b)

The Zouave, 90 F. Rep. 440.

(c)

The Sa.nr-ie,

29 F.

Rep.

923.

is

l22.

towage is

more important thai

special attention is

elsewiierc,

paid to it

in

and in

consequence,

the rules of navigation for

thfat portion of American waters.
With the understanding that tug and tow are in

law,

one

vessel, and that a steam vessel, not held with the full rigor
of a steam vessel unimpeded, and that a collision occuring with
the tow,
fault.

tLe tug rather than the tow will 'Do presumed to be in
The rest of the law governing tug and tow in

nay be found ou
collison cases.

tne following principles

collision,

laid down for other
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

In

Admiralty as in

Equity, the Statute of limitations is

governed by what a reasonable man ought or would have done in
a given case rather than by any fixed limit.

In most cases

the limit will be looked upon as passed much sooner than the
time fixed by special statutes of law.

The Statutes of limi-

tations of the states, have no application in cases where a
maritime lien has ariseii the action being one i

rem.

Actions

arising from collisions have in this respect nothing peculiar
about them aprirt from other actions in Admiralty, so it will
be sufficient to treat them generally.

While the period of

limitations is usually much shorter than at common law, it may
under special circumstarces be equal to it in length or even
longer.

However, this period of lirmitatior of action should

not be extended beyond the coimon law limit, except for some
partisl or complete inability to sue, or for some peculiarity
of a maritime nature, that dcmands recognition by an admiralty
court and makes it
cretion be applied.

plainly a matter of justice that this disA case where such an extention of time
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might be granted would be when the ves-cl in fault for a collision has escaped and it has not been possible to get it within
the courts jurisdiction for a time longer than the period of
common law limitations.

It seems that the time is not to be

extended beyond the common law period of limitations in the
discretion of the court, except in the above cases.(a)

So

where the owners of a vessel lost by collision delayed needlessly over six years his claim must be held as barred.

The quest-

ion as to what length of delay in proceedings to enforce a
maritime lien will bar an action, is aliays one fact to be determined in view of the particular circumstainces of each caseIn The Tiger 90 F. Rpt. 826.

a period of seventeen months, ten

of which the boat was out of comission and then sold to a
bona fide purchaser, was considered too long, and the libellant
was barred from recovering from such a purchaser.

Had a bona

fide purchaser not entered into the question, the delay would
very likely have been looked upon as insufficient to bar a
recovery.
(a)

The party possessed of the lien, having a right to
The Ambay. 36 F. 925.
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follow the ship even in innocent hands, it is only just that
he should enforce his rights with reasonable promptness,

in

order that innocent purchasers may not be needlessly deceived
by delay on his part.

The libellant may and may not have an

action in personam

against the owner of the ship after the

lien has been lost,

such a right not being dependent upon the lien.

So as to Statutes of limitation, they are followed by
analogy in

Adirlty

and Equity.

If

no special equitable rea-

son exists against the application of a statutory limitation,
it may be employed.

As a rule there is no equitable reason

for going beyond the statutory limit.
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COSTS.

The matter of Costs in admiralty is wholly under the control of the Court giving them.

They are sometimes from equi-

table considerations denied to the party who recovers his demand and sometimes given to the one who fails to recover anything as is the case when he has been mislead in commencing
the suit by fault of' the other party.

Undoubtedly costs gener-

ally follow the decree of the court.

However circuristarces of

equity, of hardship, of orpression or of negligence often induce the court not to follow the general rule;..(a) As to costs
in a collision suit there are no peculiarities apart from the
rest of' admiralty law.
pay the costs.

He who fails in a suit must usually

If both are in fault each pays his own costs

or they are devided.

No council fees can be allowed as costs

beyond those given by statute.(b)
may arise may be as follows.

The other conditions which

If the libel is dismissed or the

action is looked upon as being brought without cause, costs
(a) Sapphire 18 Wall. 51.
(b)

The Baltimore 8 Wal1277.
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will be given against the person so bringing.

If both are not

equally in fault, costs will be borne by the vessel most to
blame.If neither is to blameeach should bear his own
may also be ten

.

Costs

in punishment, as where a vessel not in fault

for a collision fails to render proper aid as in standing by
to save life and property.

In a case where proceodings are

had for a vessel or cargo lost or damaged, if there are several
libles which might legally be joined in one, there should not
be allowed upon them all more costs than upon the one, unless
there exists some good reason for so doing which is satisfactorily

But allowence may be made on

shown.

one libel for costs

incidentpl to several claims.(b)
As

to security for libellants costs, the Supreme Court

Rules do not seem to have expressly required any to be given.
However, in many districts by special rules process xili not
be issued until the libellant has filed a stipulation for costs
thereby agreeing to pay all costs and expenses awarded against
him by the court.
districts.
(b)

The amount required varies in

diff'erent

In some it is more than double the amount for a
Sec. 078 Rev..Stat.
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suit in rem that it is for one in personan.

Ey the district

rules in Iew York ore ceoulrity must be furnished if
lant is

a resident,

otherwise two.

the libel-

The amounts secured generally

run from one hundred to two hundred and fifty dollars.
United States was the libellant,

It' the

as would almost never be the

case in collisions, no security need be furnished, the National
government not being liable for costs in

any court.

There

being nothing peculiar about this subject as connected with
collisions, only the general principles which courts of Admiralty Jurisdiction follow have been pointed out.
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES
RULES OF NAVIGATION.

Rules of Navigation have been defined as a system of
rules and regulations to be followed in

the navigation of s ips

or vessels when approaching each other under such circumstances
that a collision may possibly ensue.

In their very definition,

it is to be noticed that they are rules formulated and enforced
for the purpose of preventing collisions between ships.

They

have practic'lly no other purpose than that of preventing loss

and property in thais manner.

of life
been in

use

Rules of navigation nave

as long as navigation has had any prominence in

aiding the world's commerce.

The principles of the rules now

employed in

American waters and amiong maritime nations, may

be found in

the laws of

Oleron

, Wisby and Rhodes.

The Rules of Navigation may be divided into four classes,
three of whicii are formulated by Congress nnd the fourth by
local authority through the permission of Congress.
First:

They are,

The International Rules.

Second: Those applying to the Great Lakes and connecting
waters.
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Third:

Those applying to certain iharbors, rivers and

inland waters.
Fourth:

Local rules by local harbor and river authorities.

The first class the International Rules,

apply to all

public and private vessels of the United States upon the Hi:h
Seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.

These rules were to tde effect as a set of

international regulations, IMarch'Ist.1895, but by a request of
Great Britain, they did not formally go into effect until July
Ist. 1897.

They may be found together with their amendments in

29 Statutes at Large P. 885.
The second class of rules, applies to all public and private vessels of the United States upon the Great Lakes, their
connecting and tributary waters, "as far East as Montreal and
the Red River of the

:.Korth",

and rivers emptying into the Gulf

of Mexico and their tributaries.
they now exist, 1.arch ist.,

These rules took elf'ect as

1895.

The third class applies as a set of special rules duly
made by local authority "to all
rivers and inland

vessels navi~rating

all harbors,

waters not included in the second class.

13i.

These took effect Oct.,

7th.,

The fourtih class are in
tions of harbors,

the nature of local police regula-

niarbor lights and riveis,

which Congress nas seen fit
reuIlate.

1897.

pilot laws,

etc.,

to leave to local authorities to

The first three classes do not differ widely.

In

fact, in a great part the second !ond third are copies of portions of the first.

Such differences as exist and are import-

ant will be pointed out.
International Rules.
The International Rules are not new, but consist principally of the rules long in

use,

somewhat c.-anged and amended to

fit the needs of a world wide international commerce.

The

construction placed upon these regulations will generally apply
equally well to those of the Great Lakes, rivers and -arbors.
Many phases that might create difficulty are given a definite
construction by the Statute itself,for

the meaning of some,

however, it will be necessary to go to the cases.
ute,
P.

except the amendments may be found in

320.,

and witli amend.ments in

This Stat-

26 Statut

29 Statutes at Large,

at Large
P.

It considers lights, signals, speel, steering and sailing

885.
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rules etc.

Only portions aiding in or

demanding construction

will be quoted.
The statute says,

it

is

to be understood that where in-

land waters are mentioned that

thoy are not to be taken as

including the Great Lakcs and tbeir connecting and tributary
waters, as far East as Montreal.
In following these sailing rules every steam vessel which
is under sail and not under steam is to be considered a sailing vessel, and every vessel under steam is to be considered
a steam vessel, whether under steam or not.

The term steam

vessel is to include any vessel propelled by machinery.

This

would include a naptha launch. But the fact that a sloop has
a small naptha engine as an auxiliary power does not allow a
steamer to treat her as a steamship and thereby be relieved
from the duty of keeping out of the way.

(a)

A vessel is under way when she is not at anchor or made
fast to the shore or aground.

A vessel slowly driving over a

sandbar would not be looked upon as under way,

but as aground.

The word "visible" waen applied to lights means visible
on a dark night in
(a) Donnell

a clear atmosphere.
v.

This gives the most

Boston Tow Boat Co., 89 F. Rep. 757.
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favorable definition tbat could well be allowed.
A slort blast o.- a horn or whistle equals a blast of about
one second.

A prolonged blast, one fcron fo-Lr to six seconds.

A long blast, one much longer than either, no specified time
being g;v,-,-.

"Ef'iclent" as applied to fog horns, etc., would seem to
mean simply what it

implies, "suitable for the purpose" of

giving a proper warning or fulfillinlg its intended purpose.
W.ot:er such a fog horn or other appliance had been furnished
would have to be determine, in ertch- case fro!i the existing
facts.
Article 16, reads, "Every vessel shall in fog, mist fallin, snow or heavy rain-storm, go at a moderate sped rnaving
careful regard to the existin- circumstances and conditions. '
"A steam vessel hearing apparently forward of her beam the
fIo;- si.-nals of a vessel, the position of which is not ascertained, shall so far as theo (irciumtamces of the case admit, stop
ner engines and then navigate with caution n:ltil davwer of
collision is over."
1,Moderate Speed.

Over the words "Moderate speed" in

the fiirst part of tifiLs
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article there has been considerable discussion.

Moderate speed

is not defined in the statute, so it has thereby been left
open for the courts to construe.

Many constructions of a more

or less conclusive character have been given.

Here it will

be profitable only to examine those which are best considered.
In the City of New York, 15 F. Rep. 624.,

it was said

that a moderate speed is at least, whatever it may be under
given circumstances, something materially less than that of
the full speed which is customary and allowable when there are
no obstructions in the way of safe navigation.

In Clare, v.

Providence etc., 20 F. Rep.535., it was attempted to show that
full speed was more safe in a fog than any slower rate of
navigation.

iuch good and expert opinion was shown to that

effect, but the Judge held that the law required a moderate
spee d which "at least means moderate speed; reduced speed, less
than usual speed", and that one wilfully

violating the law by

maintaining full speed in a fog must do so at his peril.
the case of the

Nacoochee,137 U. S. 330.,

In

the construction of

the words "moderate speed" was brought to practicaliy its
present interpretation.

In that case a steamer was going at

half speed in
and sunk her.
feet.

a heavy fog,

when it

collided with a schooner

It was possible to see ahead about five hundred

The stcamer going at the rate of half her speed would

?orge a!-ead six or eiht hundred feet after her engines were
reversed at full speed.

During the time required for reversing

the vessel would proceed about two hundred feet.

it was held

that under the circumstances the stemaer was bound to observe
unusual caution and to maintain only such a rate of speed as
would enable her to come to a stand-still by reversing her
engines~at full speed before she would collide with a vessel
wvhich she should see through the fog.

in considering the speed

to be maintained at such a time, the distance a ship coming
out of the fog would traverse if properly navigated should be
taken into account.

The construction given in

was adopted in The Umbria, 163
ed that the "general consensus

U.S. 404.

the

Nacoochee

It was there consider-

of opinion"

in

this country

was that in a fog a steamer is bound to use only such precautions
as will enable her to stop in time to avoid a collision after
the approaching vessel comes in sight, provided that the approaching vessel is

herself going at the moderate speed required by

13r.

law.

The fact that tlhe Umbria was a passenger and mail steamer

made no difference, even though such ships were in the habit
of so navigating In order to more quickly get out of the fog.
It has been said that a vessel should slow down if need be,
to the lowest rate of' speed consistent with a proper control
of the ship.

Again it has been stated that, if need be, in

order to insure safety a vessel should stop and anchor.
It
forth in

has been suggested in connection with the rule set
the Umbra above that in

order to insure absolute safety

when vessels are otherwise navigating properly,

that a moderate

speed for any vessel should only be such a speed as would permit a vessel to stop within one half the distance that
it

is'possible under the circumstances to see a vessel ahead

in

the fog.

if

the time is

night instead of day,

the whistle,

bell or horn of the other-vessel will give warning of its presence and its

lights more definitely locate its

whereabouts.

For purposes of avoiding collisions a ship becomes visible
with the appearance of its

lights.

So the meaning riven by

the court to the words moderate speed seem to be,that at any
and all

times,

when required it

means at least,

less than full

1"7.

speed,

and accordin

may be still

to the late decisions of the Supreme Court

further defined as meaning the speed demanded oy

such precautions as will enrable a vessel to stop in time to
avoid a collision, after an approaching vessel comes in sight,
the oncoming ship being properly navigated.
As to the second part of Article 16,not much need be said.
"

A steam vessel hearing apparently forward of her beam the

fog

signals of a vessel,

the position of whicn is

ed shall so far as the circumstances

not ascertain-

of the case adnit,

stop

her engines and then navilate with caution until danger of
collision is over."
What constitutes navigating with caution is
suggested t'hLan what constitutes moderate speed.

New York,

147 U.S.

72.,

more clearly
The City of

navigating with c9ution, when a fog-

horn was heard a point off her starboard bow was looked upon
as consisting merely ofr stopping her engines and then navigat-

ing with care, by means of to

imxpetus rained; but if

the

vessel seemed close at hand should reverse until the bark or
whatever the ship may be came

in

the ship should stop at once.

However,

sight.

If

any uncertainty,

this is

not to be taken

I38.

to mean that when a steamer running in
it must stop at the first sound.

the fog,

liears a signal

SucL precaution is not nec-

essary, unless the proximity of the signol be such as to indicate immediate danger.

:,%or does tlhe fact that a steamer was

a short time before the collision running at full spee-1 render
it liable, if at the tire of the collision it was running "dead
slow",

fully under control.

In

respect to the circumstances

of the collision in such a case due caution has been exercised
no otiher negligence being imputed. (a)
Application of Rules.
If any doubt arises in respect to these rules,

as to the

need of applying tLem in a particular case, they should have
the benefit o7 a doubt,

and be applied.

A clear example of

this is found in the explicit orders given in Act 24, that
"if

a vessel

or

it

shoul.

is

in

doubt as to whether she is

be as:sumed that such is

of the way accordingly."
vessel,

the article is

overtaking another

the case,

and keep out

As to what constitutes an overtaking

explicit,

obviating any chance for such

uncertainty arisiIrg as in the case of "moderate speed".
defining an overtahing vessel the Statute says that.
(a) Ludwig Halberg, 157 U.S. GO.

In

139.•

Overtaking-Vessel.
"Every vessel cc-,ing up with another vessel fron any direction more than two points abaft the beam, that is in such
a position with reference to tie other vessel which she is

overtaking that at i)ight she wolId be unable to see either of
the other vessels'

side- i.,hts, shall be dee'med an overtaking

vessel, and no subsequent alteration of the bearing between
the two vessels shall make the overtaking vessel a crossing
vessel within the mTeaning of those rules,

or release her of

the duty of keeping clear of the overtaking vessel until she
is finally past and clear."
This rule concerning overtaking vessels is expressly
stated not to be varied by any other rules of the navigation
laws.

Having once become an overtai.ing vessel a ship must con-

sider herself as meaning so until all possibility of collision
is over.

That possibility the Statute considers removed, only

when the overtaking vessel is "past and clear".

The reason

for requiring the overtaken vessel to exorcie special care,
is that such a vessel can more easily watch the others moveattending to her own.
ments, ;,ile
How Construed.
Article 27,29 and 30, point out certain matters to be
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observed in
27,

constricting thiese riles

arid obeying them.

says,"that due regard must be had to all

tion and collision,

Article

dangers of naviga-

and to any special circumstances which may

render a depqrture from them necessary in order to avoid immedi-

ate danger".

Such a case w urd be when by no fault of her own

a ship finds that to follow

tne rules of navigation would

cause her to run aground or collide with still another vessel
than the one that forced her into her difficult position.
In all such cases a ship will nave given the rules proper attention, if she tries to do the best possible under the circumstances.

If in fault, for getting in such a position, efforts made

too late to avoid a collision, will not excuse her previous
disobedience.
By Article 29, "Nothing in these rules shall exhonorate
any vessel or the owner, or master or crew thereof from the

consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals or of
any neglect to keep a proper lookout or of the neglect of any
precaution w-,ich may be required by the ordianry practice of
seamen

,

or by the special circumstances of the case."

This is imrrortant in that it leaves in force customary
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rules of action well known among seamen,
been enacted in statutory form.

that may not have

The cases recognize the force

of such custons and permit a proper adherence to them

.

It

also renders more imperative that a vessel in a hard place
should do its best under the circumstances, to avoid a collision.
But for such requirements a vessel might say it was not in
fault for the danger, and could not get away without violating
the rules,so made no effort.
By Article 30,

these rules are not to interfere with the

special rules for h-irbors, rivers and inland waters.
Concerning the force of the Rules of Navicfation, the
courts have reached one general decision to the effect that
these rules and regulations prescribed by law furnish paramout
rules of decision

in all cases where they are applied.

Out-

side of these general rules and the decisions of the court,
customs and general usage

may govern.

These rules bind Ameri-

can vessels on the High Seas as strictly as when in American
waters, and American ves_ els may be sued in the United States
courts for violating them even when the vessel sueing is

gov-

erned by an entirely different system of maritime laws.

A
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vessel of any other nation on the High Seas is 1ound by its
own laws and is liable only for such violation.(a)

However

among maritime nations there is now but small chance for such
a case to arise.
As to what are proper lights, sound and fog signals, signals of distress, the rights of sailing ves,-3els over vessels
propelled by steam modes of navigation in a fog, heavy rain or
falling snow, or at any other time, the rules set forth,too
clearly to need any further discussion here.

It is enough to

repeat the general principle which has been pointed out and
illustrated in another connection that a violation of these
rules being shown, negligence is presumed and the burden of
proof is on the one so violating

to show thnt the act complain-

ed of in no way contributed to the disaster.(b)

The only ex-

ception being when oy no possibility the violation could have
contribuited to the collision
Rules for Great Lakes.
The rules and regulations for the Great Lakes differ from
the International rules more widely than those for Larbors,
(a), The

Belgenlai-,),l14,

(b) The

Zouave, 90 Fed. Rep. 440.

..
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rivers and iiIland waters.
age,

rafts,

canal boats,

in respect to the same.
in-

_Special

small craft and the lights and signals
Regulations are also prescribed difi'er-

from the International rules,

narrow channels,

attention is given to tow-

in

regard to navigating in

rivers and currents where extra care is

quired by vessels meeting and passing.

In

re-

general the regula-

tions are such as the peculiar physical conditions existing on
the Great Lakes and the rivers flowing into the Gulf of Mexico
and the lake and river craft there employed, would demand.
With such rivers as the Detroit and St. Clair, the Mississippi
and other streams flowing into the Gulf to navigate, and different kinds of vessels navigating theere,

such as are above men-

tioned, a somewhat different set of rules is necessary.

No

special peculiarity of construction however, is found in these
rules whic=

the rules themselves, or the constructions given

to the doubtful points in the International regulations would
not .iale clear. They are found in 28 Statutes at Large, P.645.
Harbor and River Rules.
The rules and regulations applying to harbors,rivers and
inland waters wore separated into two divisionrs coprising
classes "three" and"four".

Class three as indicated, consists

I4f.

of

cith rules as have been passed by Congress applying to the

above navigable waters.

Class four consists of local regula-

tions applying to the same.

In the rules passed by Congress,

"Inl'Ind waters" are not to be understood as including the Great
Lakes and their connecting anLd tributary waters as far East as
Montreal.

It is to be noticed, that this definition does not

comprise the navigable rivers flowing into the Gulf of Mexico
which are included, so far as applicable,

in

the rules and re-

gulations to prevent collisions on the Great Lakes.

These

special waters being excepted and az others from the general
meaning of the v,,rds "inland waters",

the regulations must be

considered as applicable to all the rest therein included,
namely to the Mississippi River and other rivers flowing into
the Gulf of Mexico.

These regulations are very mucr. the same

as the International Rules as far as they Co.

In

fact when

Congress first enacted a general system of regulations to avoid
collisions in hqrbors, rivers and inland waters, special portions of the previous maritime renulatiors were selected and
designated as h.aving full force upon tiuose waters.
rules are to be found in 26 Statutes at Large,

The present

P. 90.,

certain
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portions of the International Rules that apply only to ocean
navigation are omitted,

and such changes and additions have

been made as tl.e more crowded condition of harbors, riveros and
inland waters with their different kinds of craft demand.
Greater frequency of signals is required, special regulations
are riven as to li :hts,

pilot boats,

tugs,

row-boats and other

craft common to rivers and harbors, but not known on the High
Seas.

Lights are provided distinguishing seagoing ships from

those of the harbor or

river.

By the wording of the Statuteq these rules"apply as special
rules duly made by local authority, to all vessels navigating
all harbors, rivers, etc."

WVether they are to be regarded as

applying to vessels of foreign nations does not seem clear.
They are to apply "as special rules made by local authority"
and "to all vessels".

The trouble rests in the fact that the

rules enacted by local harbor and river authorities are not
looked upon as binding upon foreign vessels fully observing the
International Rules.

These rules, though largely a copy from

those regulations are distinctly stated to apply as special
rules duly made by local authority.

Vnether ti:e fact that they

146.

are primarily

enacted oy Coi,,r ,sz

would

moke any differe,cce

If7 it does not, and they are

does not appear.

as harbor re, ;iiations by local authorities,
United States vessels public and y, rivate.

to be classed

they apply only to
It

would seon from

the care taken to expressly state thlat ti.ey are to be looked
upon as regulations by local authority, that they were intended
to have only the force of such re.ilations.
Local Regulati on-.
V7hat has been said concerning the construction placed
upon special words and p:,rases in the International Rules,
applies here where the same are used.

These regulations iay be

found in 30 Statutes at Large, P. 06.
The second division of harbor and river rules, or "Clas
four" as the rules pertaining to navirzation were divided, consist only of such regulations as Congress has see., fit to leave
in control of local authorities.
regulations and

They are local and h-arbor

pilot rules to be observed in

or rivers to whici

they relate.

if

the special harbor

violated by Public or pri-

vate vessels of the United States, such violation will be deemed negligence.

They have force as mere police regulations;

and as has been said,

do not afi ect the vessels of roreim7
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nations. (a).
Briefly summed up, the rules and regulations for navi-ation
are the best criterion for deciding whetiher a vessel i~as acted
properly, and in so deciding, they are to be construed with
reasonable strictness.

They are to be looked upon as arplicable

in all cases until the contrary is shown.

They ihave been form-

ulated to prevent the loss of life and property by means of
collisions, so if at any time, the excencies of a situation
plainly demanded a departure from them in order to insure safety, they are not ten to be construed as requiring a strict adnerence.

Such a departure must, however, in order to receive

the benefit of such a construction have been made through thle
demands of necessity or in the excitement of immediate collision
for which the ship departing is not in fault.

If

a vessel

doggedly adheres to th-ese rules in the face of inevitable colIision, the prescribed course being pursued, its act will be
construed as a violation ol" the -eneral intent of the statutes
in not using due care under tne circumstancos.
Section 4412, of the Revisel Statutes of the United States,
provides for a board of Supervising Inspectors, who "shall
(a) The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186.
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establish sucl, regulations as may be necessary,

to be observed

by steam vessels in passing each other as they from time to
time slmll think necessary for safety."'
of' one Supervisi-

This board consists

isu,-rector General and ten supervisory in-

spectors.

The rules thus passcd are to add to the rules of

Congress.

Two copies are to be furnished to vessels and con-

spicuously posted.
Further quotations fCrc:. tie various statutes regulating
navigation in American waters does not seem necessary.
wording is
to but little
enactments.

Their

clear and any furtner comment upon them would amount
more than a repetition of the words of the different
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CONCU RENT JURISDICTION OF
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS.

Subdivision t,.ree of Sec. 711, Rev. Stat., gives to the
United States courts Admiralty Jurisdiction as follows: "exclusive jurisdiction of all civil cases of Admiralty and llaritie
jurisdiction,

saving to suitors in

all

cases the right of a

Common law remedy wi'ere tfio Co:-I on law is competent to give it."
This clause would indicate that i1 some cases the Fodorai
jurisdiction would be exclusive and in

other concurrent with

jurisdiction possessed by tne cojirts of the state.
of there being sucL. concurront jurisdiction in

The question

adniralty ro!-

lisions has been decided by a number of cases following shortly after the Genessee Chief, which assured to the Federal
courts jurisdiction over the Great Lakes.
Wall-

555,

In iine,v. Trevor 4

a collision occurred between tne steamships Hine and

Sunshine on tLe Nfississippi River near St.
was injured,

later

the Hine was seized in

Louis.

The Sunshine

order to be sold

in accordance with a proceeding under tne laws of Iowa,

in

satisfaction of damages-sustained by the Sunshine.

By the

iowa code, a lien wus given against any boat found in the
waters of the state,

for injury sustaired bv persons or property.

The proceeding was one strictly

in

rem and the owners of the

Hive interposed a plea to the Jurisdiction of the State Courts.
It

was held,

that all

state Statutes which attempted to confer

upon State Courts a remedy for marine tacts and cont.racts by
proceeding strictly in rem were void

being in conflict with

the act of Congress of 1789, except as to cases arising on the
Lakes and connecting waters.

Nor could sucl. state statutes be

looked upon as within the saving clause of the act in respect
to Common law remedies.

This rule however, does riot prvent

the seizure and sale by the State Co1arts of the interest of an
owner or part owner in a vessel, either by attachment or by
general execution, when the proceeding is a personal action
against such an owner to recover a debt for which he is personally liable, nor does it prevent any action from being brought
in the State Courts, which the Common law gives for obtaining
a judgment in personam against a party liable in a marine contract or marine tact.

The Moses Taylor 4 Wall. 441., is to

thle same general effect as the previous case entirely denying
jurisdiction in the state courts whten it is there attempted to
grant a remedy for a marine contract or :,rinc tact by proceedings strictly in rem.

All such claims when a remedy in rem is

given, are looked upon as exclusively in the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts.
In
exist.

proceedings

in personar

concurrent jurisdiction may

The clause "saving the rights of common law remedy

where the Common Law is competent to give it", does not according to Hinev. Trevorauthorize a proceeding in rem to enforce
a maritime lien in

a Common law court,

State or Federal.

The Common Law remedies are not at all appli-

cable to enforce such liens

.

whether that court is

They are as has been indicated,

suits in personam, even though under special statute they may
be commenced by attachment against the debtor-

So in all cases

when a maritime lien arises, whether from a tact or a contract
the original jurisdiction to enforce it by a proceeding in
rem must be exclusively in the District Courts of the United
States. (a)
(a)

The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.

152.

The granting of a right of action in

personam for loss of

life, is not in conflict with tL-e Admiralty jurisdiction of
the district courts of' the United States even though no such
remedy existed apart from the state statute.
has given a remedy in

personam not existing in

Federal Courts will enforce it
rules and laws of Admiralty.

States,

and it

is

adniralty,

the

so long as not contrary to the
The steamboat Co.,

Wall. 522.
Appeal.
Where an action has been brought in
sonam,

Where the state

v.

Chase 10

a state court in

per-

appealed to the Supreme Court of the United

the party

plaintiff

having elected to pursue his

Common law remedies in a State Court,

the rules of the Common

law will be applied on appeal and not the rules of Admiralty.
This makes th-e jurisdiction of the Federpl and state courts
concurrent not only over the question iu
in

the law applied.

litigation,

An example of this is

has brought his action in

but also

wriere a plaintiff

personam for the loss of his ship.

BotL ships were negligent and contributed to the collision.
At Common law such being the case, no recovery can be had.
case being al..pealed to the Supreme Court,

the Admiralty rule

The

1
~

will not be applied, but the rule at law.

~

*

The jurisdiction is

concurrent both as to the matter of the action, and as to
remedies an

lied.

has elected such a system of

The plfintif.

law to give him his remedy and the Federal Courts will not a-tr,iards when he has discovered that his choice was a poor one,
give him tiho benefit of a system of law more favorable to his
cause.

Having made an election,

The cases sunmed up,
action arisingi
contract

he must stid

by it.(a)

seem to amount to tnis; W.en

to enforce a marine

because of a collision is

or to gain satisfaction for a -narine tact,

courts have a concurrent jurisdiction,
rem, but if

the

if

tve state

the v-roceeding is

in pcrsonaon such concurrent jurisdiction

strictly

in

exists.

In all cases where a common law right of action remains

and also it seems where a right of action has been given in
personam by State Statutes,

as in

and not contrary to Federal laws,

the Stcamboat Co..

jurisdiction extends only to actions in

(a)

In

Chase,u53 U.S.

374.

short concurrent

perso91.

law there 1-as always been a

Belden v.

Chase,

ti-e state Las concurrent

jurisdiction with the Federal Courts.

At Comraqon

v.

right

of action for

14.

damages arising from a collision at sea, so the provision that
such rights are reserved-,

clearly -lves concurrent jurisdiction

to th.e Co;-non law courts of the states.
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